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INTRODUCTION
It takes little insight to recognize fundamental tensions between
constitutional protections of commercial speech and efforts to safe-
guard the public's health.' The First Amendment values autonomy, 2
t Professor of Law, University of Florida. An earlier version of this paper
was presented at a health law conference at the University of Texas School of Law. In
small measure, it also provided the basis for my contribution to Grand Rounds in
Dermatology at UF's Health Sciences Center.
1 See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin & Gail H. Javitt, Health Promotion and the
First Amendment: Government Control of the Informational Environment, 79 MIL-
BANK Q. 547, 550, 552-53, 565-66 (2001); Wendy E. Parmet & Jason A. Smith, Free
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while public health promotion often reflects paternalistic impulses,
not trusting citizens to make sensible lifestyle choices. Some public
health measures aim, of course, to facilitate autonomous decisionmak-
ing by attempting to ensure fuller access to useful information, wheth-
er by guarding against deceptive advertising or mandating the provi-
sion of otherwise undersupplied information.3  Because such
approaches do not, however, work well at moving individuals' beha-
vior in directions desired by the government, public health officials
may attempt to control choice more directly.4 Although direct controls
would not run into free speech obstacles, other constitutional rights
might stand in the way, to say nothing of political resistance and im-
plementation difficulties.
Given the intrinsic shortcomings encountered with these two op-
tions, a potentially appealing intermediate course exists: limit access
Speech and Public Health: A Population-Based Approach to the First Amendment, 39
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 363, 420, 430 (2006).
2 See Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amend-
ment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 581 (2004) ("While the rest of the Constitution
contains no general prohibition on paternalism as a justification for state regulation,
the First Amendment is hostile to it."); id. at 585 n.21 ("not[ing] the strong antipater-
nalist strain in the Court's commercial speech cases"); id. at 587-609 (canvassing
commercial and professional free speech decisions); David A. Strauss, Persuasion,
Autonomy, and Freedom ofExpression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 334 (1991) (explain-
ing that "the government may not justify a measure restricting speech by invoking
harmful consequences that are caused by the persuasiveness of the speech"); id. at
343-46 (discussing the role of this idea in commercial speech doctrine).
See, e.g., Stephanie Rosenbloom, Most Chains Told to Post Calorie Data,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at BI (discussing a little-noticed provision in the federal
health care reform legislation that calls on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to promulgate rules that would make restaurants with twenty or more outlets
disclose calorie information in their menus even though little evidence demonstrates
the effectiveness of such requirements); Don Sapatkin, Assessing the Impact of Menu
Nutrition Labeling Laws, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 23, 2011, at Al; see also N.Y. State
Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to a requirement that restaurants post calorie information).
4 See, e.g., Victoria Colliver, Ban on Trans Fats Hits State's Restaurants,
S.F. CHRON., Dec. 31, 2009, at Cl; John Tierney, Public Policy That Makes Test
Subjects of Us All, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2009, at DI (criticizing recent New York City
initiatives against salt and trans fats); see also William Neuman, Tempest in a Soda
Bottle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2009, at B I (reporting that an article in the New England
Journal of Medicine favoring imposition of a penny-per-ounce tax on sugary beve-
rages "cited research on price elasticity for soft drinks that has shown that for every
10 percent rise in price, consumption declines 8 to 10 percent"); Andrew Zajac &
Melissa Healy, FDA Puts the Pinch on Salt: Citing Risks to Health, the Agency Calls
for Food Makers to Cut Sodium Voluntarily, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2010, at Al
("While public health advocates . . . hailed the clampdown, libertarian skeptics of
government viewed it as another sign of a nanny state run amok.").
[Vol. 21:3132
2011] COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH VS. PUBLIC HEALTH PROMOTION 33
to the information that encourages undesirable choices.5 This option
does not, of course, seem "intermediate" when viewed from a First
Amendment perspective.6 Although less intrusive and more politically
palatable than direct control of behavior,7 and also much more likely
to work than risk disclosure requirements or public education cam-
paigns,8 suppressing information simply because it tends to result in
s To continue the use of illustrations involving food, imagine prohibitions
on advertising by fast-food restaurants or sellers of unhealthy processed food products
targeted to children. See Shin-Yi Chou et al., Fast-food Advertising on Television and
Its Influence on Childhood Obesity, 51 J.L. & EcoN. 599, 616 (2008); Michael Mink
et al., Nutritional Imbalance Endorsed by Televised Food Advertisements, 110 J. AM.
DIETETIC Ass'N 904, 908-09 (2010); Juliet B. Schor & Margaret Ford, From Tastes
Great to Cool: Children's Food Marketing and the Rise of the Symbolic, 35 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 10 (2007); Symposium, Food Marketing to Children and the Law, 39 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 1 (2006); William Neuman, Ad Rules Stall, Keeping Cereal a Cartoon
Staple, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2010, at Al.
6 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193
(1999) ("[T]he power to prohibit or to regulate particular conduct does not necessarily
include the power to prohibit or regulate speech about that conduct. . . . It is well
settled that the First Amendment mandates closer scrutiny of government restrictions
on speech than of its regulation of commerce alone."); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 512 (1996) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he First Amendment directs
that government may not suppress speech as easily as it may suppress conduct, and
that speech restrictions cannot be treated as simply another means that the govern-
ment may use to achieve its ends."); Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the
First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REv. 589, 601-02 (1996); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free
Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 959-64 (1995) (defending the
asymmetrical constitutional treatment of government regulation of market transac-
tions and restrictions on speech). Herein, of course, lies the central fallacy of the
argument that the greater power to prohibit an activity altogether includes the purpor-
tedly lesser power to restrict advertising about it. See generally William W. Van
Alstyne, To What Extent Does the Power of Government to Determine the Boundaries
and Conditions of Lawful Commerce Permit Government to Declare Who May Adver-
tise and Who May Not?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1513 (2002).
See Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective
Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1317, 1380 (1988) ("Restraints on speech promoting a
commercial activity constitute a useful intermediate step between inaction and restric-
tion of the activity itself. We should not readily conclude that this step, often the only
politically feasible avenue available, is constitutionally proscribed."); see also Lars
Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right to Know" from the "Need
to Know" About Consumer Product Hazards, II YALE J. ON REG. 293, 296 (1994)
("Labeling requirements frequently are justified as inexpensive alternatives to more
burdensome design requirements or outright prohibitions."); id. at 397-98 (same);
Lars Noah, Regulating Cigarettes: (Non)sense and Sensibility, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 677,
690 (1998) (favoring an outright prohibition on "the sale of some or all types of to-
bacco products" or a congressional decision "to tax such products into oblivion" over
a dubious FDA claim of jurisdiction to regulate their advertising, but recognizing the
lack of political will to take such steps).
For instance, the federal "food pyramid" has not accomplished much. See
Kim Severson, The Government's Pyramid Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2005, § 4,
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suboptimal consumer choices reflects a decidedly paternalistic ap-
proach anathema to the First Amendment. In other domains where
constitutional rights may conflict with public health efforts, the Su-
preme Court has shown a degree of flexibility.9 In commercial speech
cases, however, it has become increasingly unwilling to find a middle
ground;'o in recent years, for instance, the Court has invalidated re-
strictions on the advertising of alcohol and tobacco products notwith-
standing the serious threats that these pose to the public health."
at 14; cf Gostin & Javitt, supra note 1, at 566-67, 570-75 (offering a somewhat more
generous account of public health education efforts).
9 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (rejecting privacy objec-
tions to a state recordkeeping requirement for prescriptions of controlled substances);
Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1922); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (upholding a municipal regulation requiring vaccination against smallpox);
Wendy E. Parmet et al., Individual Rights Versus the Public's Health-100 Years
After Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 652, 652 (2005) ("[T]his
seminal opinion has served as the constitutional foundation for state actions limiting
liberty in the name of public health."); cf Lars Noah, Too High a Price for Some
Drugs?: The FDA Burdens Reproductive Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 231, 243-58
(2007) (arguing that the federal government may have gone too far in its attempts to
control certain patient behaviors directly).
10 See David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Re-
considered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1059 (2004) (observing that a pair of
recent decisions "mark a sea change in the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence
because, in both cases, the Court was willing to place the free speech rights of com-
mercial speakers above public health interests deemed by the Court to be valid and
significant"); id. at 1067-68 (Since 1976 "the Court has decided two dozen commer-
cial speech cases. In only five cases has the Court upheld a restraint on commercial
speech, and there is reason to doubt that the Court today would rule the same way in
at least three of those cases. The Court has not upheld a single restraint in the past
decade." (footnotes omitted)); Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech: A New Model
for Commercial Speech and Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2836, 2854
(2005) ("[T]he trend in recent years has been toward a stronger commercial speech
doctrine, with a possible shift to full First Amendment protection coming in the fu-
ture."). On the more general tendency of free speech rights to trump competing inter-
ests, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 783; Paul D. Carrington, Our
Imperial First Amendment, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 1167 (2001); Daniel J.H. Greenwood,
First Amendment Imperialism, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 659.
1 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561-67 (2001); 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507-08, 516 (1996) (plurality opi-
nion); see also RJR MacDonald Inc. v. Canada, [1995] 127 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (invalidat-
ing on free speech principles a Canadian law prohibiting most forms of tobacco ad-
vertising). Shortly after Congress granted the FDA limited jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco products, lower courts confronted First Amendment challenges to statutory
restrictions on advertising. See Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F.
Supp. 2d 512, 525-26, 534-36 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (finding merit to only some of these
objections).
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This Article focuses on efforts by the U.S. Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) to restrict the dissemination of information about
medical technologies. The FDA has had an enviable record of success
in the courts because judges have shown tremendous deference to the
agency's expertise in implementing its public health mission, 12 but
recently it has fared less well when challenged on First Amendment
grounds. Part I summarizes the evolution of commercial free speech
doctrine, concluding with an extended discussion of the Supreme
Court's latest word on the subject in a case involving the FDA. Part II
evaluates the constitutionality of the agency's current and proposed
restrictions on the advertising of therapeutic products to physicians
and patients. Insofar as the FDA has gone beyond simply guarding
against the dissemination of false or misleading information and seeks
to promote broader public health goals, the agency must confront the
Court's increasingly clear message that paternalistic speech regulation
invariably offends the Constitution.
I. THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
PROTECTION
Since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has recognized that ad-
vertising enjoys some of the First Amendment's guarantees for free-
dom of expression. The sections that follow proceed chronologically,
drawing particular attention to the importance of context in under-
standing the Court's seemingly ad hoc-some would say largely in-
coherent-approach to resolving these cases.13 As it happens, the first
12 See, e.g., Henley v. FDA, 77 F.3d 616, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1996); Schering
Corp. v. FDA, 51 F.3d 390, 399 (3d Cir. 1995). Courts also have given the agency
even greater leeway than normal on questions of statutory interpretation for this rea-
son. See United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798
(1969) (noting "the well-accepted principle that remedial legislation such as the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act is to be given a liberal construction consistent with the Act's
overriding purpose to protect the public health"); United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277, 280 (1943) (same); cf 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 600
(1951) ("In our anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting the pub-
lic, we must take care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the point where
Congress indicated it would stop.") (quoted with approval in FDA v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000)).
1 See C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The
Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1167 n.30
(2004) (noting "doctrinal incoherency" and "the possibility to cite stray statements in
commercial speech precedent on either side of most disputes"); Robert Post, The
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1, 42-43, 54-55
(2000); id. at 3 ("Lacking firm jurisprudential foundations, commercial speech doc-
trine has veered wildly between divergent and inconsistent approaches."); Vladeck,
supra note 10, at 1085 ("The commercial speech doctrine remains a controversial
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and last words on the subject have involved advertising by profession-
als who dispense prescription drugs, though decisions involving pub-
lic health menaces help to provide the foundation necessary for then
evaluating in Part II various restrictions on the marketing of medical
technologies.
In the first commercial free speech decision in this line, Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,14
the Court struck down a state prohibition against the advertising of
prescription drug prices. It decided that even speech proposing a
commercial transaction-bereft of other qualities typically associated
with protected expression-deserved some constitutional solicitude,
noting that the public's interest in the free flow of commercial infor-
mation might be "as keen, if not keener by far" than its interest in
political debate.15 The Court added that the information at issue could
have a profound impact on the consumer's quality of life: "When drug
prices vary as strikingly as they do, information as to who is charging
what becomes more than a convenience. It could mean the alleviation
of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities." 1 6 The lone
dissenter forecast with alarm that the majority's approach would pre-
vent the government from prohibiting prescription drug advertising
doctrine in considerable flux."). On the need to pay attention to context in this area,
see Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212 (1983); id. at 1216
(promising to show "why the commercial speech problem is in fact many problems,
and why the small questions will not go away").
14 425 U.S. 748 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Virginia Pharmacy in main
text]; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating a
state prohibition on advertising nonprescription contraceptives); Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (invalidating a prohibition on newspaper advertisements by
out-of-state abortion providers, noting that the "relationship of speech to the market-
place of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of
ideas"). Prior to this time, the Court had suggested that the First Amendment placed
no limitations on regulation of advertising. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52,
54 (1942); see also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History
of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv. 747, 754-74 (1993).
" Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 763.
16 Id. at 763-64; see also Robert Pear, Medicare Web Site to Provide Com-
parative Data on Retail Prices of Prescription Medicines, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2004,
at A 16 ("The process of setting drug prices is notoriously secretive.... Comparison
shopping is difficult."). One should not lose sight of the fact that consumers (listen-
ers) initiated the challenge. See Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 754-55; Alan B. Morrison,
How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: An Originalist's Recollections, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1189, 1192-93 (2004); id. at 1198 (adding that "those who
studied these laws [against drug price advertising] and their origins were convinced
that the pharmacists, who did not want price competition and who were the main
supporters of these laws, did want to limit price shopping").
36 [Vol. 21:31
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directed to consumers,' 7 a promotional technique that would not be-
come commonplace until two decades later.' 8
In Virginia Pharmacy, the majority recognized that the "durabili-
ty" and "hardiness" of commercial speech reduces the risk that regula-
tion might chill it.19 Coupled with the assumption that disseminators
of such expression could better verify its truthfulness, these attributes
may "make it appropriate to require that a commercial message appear
in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and
disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive."20 The
Court expressed suspicion, however, about government efforts to
achieve collateral goals through the suppression of truthful and non-
misleading information:
[T]he State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large meas-
ure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance. . . . It
is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of sup-
pressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is
freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us.21
Over the next quarter of a century (and notwithstanding occasional
backsliding), the Supreme Court has made this much abundantly
clear: although the government may protect consumers from false or
misleading information, it generally may not prohibit truthful and
nondeceptive claims in pursuit of some other valuable ends.
A. From Professional Services to Undesirable Behaviors
In the years immediately following Virginia Pharmacy, the Su-
preme Court confronted a series of cases challenging restrictions on
marketing by lawyers and other professionals. In 1977, it struck down
17 See Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 781, 788-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
8 See Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing
the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 141-43 (1997); see also
infra Part 1I.B (discussing the constitutionality of restrictions on such advertising).
19 See Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
20 Id. at 772 n.24; cf Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First
Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 372, 385-86 (1979) (questioning the distinc-
tion between commercial and political speech premised on the relative ease of verifi-
cation); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76
VA. L. REV. 627, 634-52 (1990) (disputing these grounds for distinguishing commer-
cial speech); David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial
Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 405-10 (1990) (same).
2 Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 769-70; see also Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465,
482 (1987) ("We wholly rejected these justifications [in Virginia Pharmacy], finding
that the ban was predicated upon assumptions about the reactions the public would
have if they obtained the 'wrong' kind of information.").
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a blanket prohibition on attorney price advertising in newspapers,
writing that:
[S]ignificant societal interests are served by such speech. Ad-
vertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry infor-
mation of import to significant issues of the day. And com-
mercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability,
nature, and prices of products and services, and thus performs
an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a free
enterprise system.22
The next year, the Court upheld a prohibition on in-person attorney
solicitation as a safeguard against coercion,2 3 but it struck down a
24disciplinary action based on written solicitation of clients. In 1979,
the Court rejected a challenge to a state prohibition on the use of trade
names by optometrists.2 5
In 1980, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public
Service Commission,26 the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a
22 Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (citations omitted); see also
id at 383 ("[L]eeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has been allowed in
other contexts has little force in the commercial arena."); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977) (striking down a prohibition on
the posting of "For Sale" signs in an effort to reduce the departure of white home-
owners from racially integrating neighborhoods).
23 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) ("Unlike a
public advertisement, which simply provides information and leaves the recipient free
to act upon it or not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an
immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or reflec-
tion."); see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 776 (1993) ("The ban on attorney
solicitation in Ohralik was prophylactic in the sense that it prohibited conduct condu-
cive to fraud or overreaching at the outset, rather than punishing the misconduct after
it occurred.").
24 See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978) (involving solicitation of
clients in order to pursue public interest litigation); see also Shapero v. Ky. Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 475 (1988) (contrasting written and personal solicitation); cf
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291, 295-300
(2007) (plurality opinion) (upholding against a First Amendment challenge an organi-
zation's restrictions on high school coaches recruiting middle school athletes); id. at
298 ("[T]he dangers of undue influence and overreaching that exist when a lawyer
chases an ambulance are also present when a high school coach contacts an eighth
grader."); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632-39
(1980) (invalidating an ordinance restricting in-person solicitation on behalf of charit-
able organizations).
25 See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979); id. at 12-13 ("Because
these ill-defined associations of trade names with price and quality information can be
manipulated by the users of trade names, there is a significant possibility that trade
names will be used to mislead the public.").
26 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
38 [Vol. 21:31
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state regulation unmistakably designed to influence consumer beha-
vior. It devised a four-part test for resolving commercial free speech
challenges:
For commercial speech to come within [the First Amend-
ment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mis-
leading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental in-
terest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers,
we must determine whether the regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 27
In other words, assuming that the speech does not relate to some un-
lawful activity and is not inherently misleading, the government may
restrict commercial speech only to achieve a substantial interest, and
then only to the extent necessary.
In Central Hudson, the Court had to decide whether the State of
New York's Public Service Commission could prohibit utility compa-
ny advertisements that promoted the consumption of electricity with-
out running afoul of the First Amendment. Applying the first prong of
its newly elaborated test, the Court found that the advertising related
to a lawful activity and was not misleading.2 8 Under the second prong,
it concluded that the government's asserted interests in encouraging
energy conservation and promoting fair utility rates were substantial.29
Under the third prong of its test, however, the Court questioned the
link between the advertising prohibition and the utility's rate structure,
even if there was an "immediate connection" between the advertising
at issue and demand for electricity. 30 Finally, the Court determined
that the Commission's order failed the fourth prong of the test because
it was "more extensive than necessary" to accomplish the govern-
27 Id. at 566. In subsequent decisions, the four-part Central Hudson analysis
evolved somewhat: the initial prong became more of a threshold inquiry and the other
prongs now constitute a tripartite (though not exactly a "balancing") test. This differ-
ence does not appear to have had any substantive effect on the decisions, though it
may suggest that the first prong has atrophied into a mere formality while emphasiz-
ing that the more relevant prongs parallel the intermediate scrutiny test used in other
constitutional contexts. Cf Bd. Trs. SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (explain-
ing that the framework is "substantially similar" to the test for time, place, and man-
ner restrictions of core speech).
28 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
29 See id. at 569.
30 See id. ("[T]he Commission's laudable concern over the equity and effi-
ciency of appellant's rates does not provide a constitutionally adequate reason for
restricting protected speech.").
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ment's goals. 31 The Commission failed to show that a more limited
approach to regulating advertising-something short of an outright
prohibition-could not accomplish its legitimate ends.32
Both before and after Central Hudson, controls on lawyer adver-
tising have accounted for the bulk of the Court's commercial speech
cases.33 In 1982, it reviewed a rule that prohibited attorneys from in-
cluding in their advertisements any information outside of that speci-
fied in ten limited categories.34 The Court concluded that there was
nothing inherently misleading about the type of advertising in ques-
tion, despite the fact that it deviated from the prescribed format, and
that the state had no substantial interest to justify the restrictions.35
Furthermore, the Court added that the absolute prohibitions set forth
" See id. at 570.
32 See id; see also id. at 565 ("The State cannot ... completely suppress
information when narrower restrictions on expression would serve its interests as
well."); id at 566 n.9 ("We review with special care regulations that entirely suppress
commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy."). The Court, how-
ever, seemingly would have allowed the government to restrict speech in order to
dampen demand so long as it acted with greater precision. See id. at 573 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in judgment) ("leav[ing] open the possibility that the State may sup-
press advertising of electricity in order to lessen demand for electricity"); C. Edwin
Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 983 (2009)
("Under Central Hudson, if the state has a substantial interest in preventing some
legal behavior, it purportedly can 'paternalistically' prevent people from receiving
argument or information that promotes the behavior, such as advertisements promot-
ing increased electrical usage."); cf Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("I seriously doubt whether suppression of information con-
cerning the availability and price of a legally offered product is ever a permissible
way for the state to 'dampen' demand for or use of the product."); id. at 577 ("The
Court . . . [has] resolved beyond all doubt that a strict standard of review applies to
suppression of commercial information, where the purpose of the restraint is to influ-
ence behavior by depriving citizens of information."); id. at 581 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (same); Redish, supra note 6, at 613 ("At most, the Court's accep-
tance of the pro-paternalism model in Central Hudson was dictum, and implied dic-
tum at that.").
33 See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S.
91 (1990) (plurality opinion); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Bates
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyer Advertising
and the Philosophical Origins of the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 36 U. RICH. L.
REV. 91 (2002); Rodney A. Smolla, Lawyer Advertising and the Dignity of the Pro-
fession, 59 ARK. L. REV. 437 (2006); Nat Stern, Commercial Speech, Irrational
Clients, and the Persistence of Bans on Subjective Lawyer Advertising, 2009 BYU L.
REv. 1221.
34 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 194-96 (1982). For example, attorneys could
not list the tribunals before which they were admitted to practice. See id. at 198.
35 See id. at 205-07.
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in the rule were not the only alternatives that would effectively ac-
complish the state's asserted goal of preventing consumer deception. 36
Three years later, however, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel,37 the Court upheld a state rule requiring the disclosure of
attorneys' fee information in print advertisements. 38 In applying Cen-
tral Hudson's fourth prong, the Court demanded only that the state
regulation be "reasonably related" to the asserted governmental inter-
est.39 The Court accepted as plausible the fear that average consumers
of legal services would not, when reading an advertisement about a
contingency fee arrangement, understand that they might owe court
costs even if their lawsuit failed.40 Separately, however, the Court
held it improper to reprimand the petitioner for using a nondeceptive
illustration and offering services regarding a specific legal problem in
a print advertisement.41 "[T]he free flow of commercial information is
valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs
of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the mis-
leading, and the harmless from the harmful."4 2
36 Id. at 206; see also id. at 203 (explaining that a law regulating potentially
misleading advertising must be "no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the
deception").
[W]hen the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is
inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such ad-
vertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions.
Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the States may not
place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading in-
formation ... if the information also may be presented in a way that is not
deceptive.
Id; see also id. at 200 n. 1 ("If experience with particular price advertising indicates
that the public is in fact misled or that disclaimers are insufficient to prevent decep-
tion, then the matter would come to the Court in an entirely different posture.").
1 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
3 See id. at 650-53, 655-56.
39 Id. at 651.
We reject appellant's contention that we should subject disclosure require-
ments to a strict "least restrictive means" analysis under which they must be
struck down if there are other means by which the State's purposes may be
served. Although we have subjected outright prohibitions on speech to such
analysis, all our discussions of restraints on commercial speech have rec-
omimended disclosure requirements as one of the acceptable less restrictive
alternatives to actual suppression of speech.
Id at 651-52 n.14.
40 See id. at 652-53.
41 See id. at 641-49.
42 Id. at 646; see also id. ("Were we to accept the State's argument in this
case, we would have little basis for preventing the government from suppressing other
forms of truthful and nondeceptive advertising simply to spare itself the trouble of
distinguishing such advertising from false or deceptive advertising.").
HEALTH M TRIX
During the late 1980s, the Court applied the nexus prongs of the
Central Hudson test even less strictly, thereby diluting the protections
afforded to commercial speech. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates
v. Tourism Company,43 for example, it reviewed a 1948 statute that
had prohibited casino advertising directed at residents of Puerto Rico
but permitted such advertising when aimed at non-residents. Initially,
the Court noted that casino gambling was lawful in Puerto Rico, that
the advertising in question was not misleading, and that the govern-
ment had a substantial interest in protecting the welfare of its citi-
zens.44 In applying the third prong of the Central Hudson test, the
Court showed significant deference to the Puerto Rican legislature's
conclusion that the advertising ban would discourage gambling among
residents.45 Under the fourth prong, the Court simply noted that the
ban applied only to Puerto Rican residents, 46 adding that the govern-
ment enjoyed the prerogative to decide whether an alternative ap-
4' 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
44 See id at 340-41. For a suggestion that the restriction had more to do with
stifling competition than protecting residents, see David A. Strauss, Constitutional
Protection for Commercial Speech: Some Lessons from the American Experience, 17
CAN. Bus. L.J. 45, 46-48 (1990).
45 See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342 (finding that the legislature's choice was a
"reasonable one"). Posadas attracted a torrent of academic criticism. See, e.g., Sylvia
A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REv. 909, 938-42 (1992);
Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech: New Words with an
Old Message, 72 MINN. L. REV. 289, 299-304 (1987); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Con-
stitutional Future of the Bill of Rights: A Closer Look at Commercial Speech and
State Aid to Religiously Affiliated Schools, 65 N.C. L. REV. 917, 923-29 (1987); Fre-
derick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1182 & n.l (1988) (characterizing Posadas as irreconcilable
with Central Hudson). But see Daniel H. Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff': Persuasion,
Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1230-31 (1988)
(arguing that Posadas was consistent with the Court's differing treatment of informa-
tional and non-informational advertising).
46 See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 343; see also Bd. Trs. SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 475-77 (1989) (upholding a rule barring representatives of all but a few types of
businesses from operating on state university campuses because the government had a
substantial interest in promoting a safe, secure educational atmosphere and preventing
exploitation of students by commercial enterprises); Burt Neuborne, The First
Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 29
n.78 (1989) (noting that Posadas "comes close to endorsing information manipulation
as a tool for government attempts to control behavior"); Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Com-
ment, Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Interme-
diate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1931, 1950 (1992) ("Taken together, Posa-
das and Fox represent a substantial reduction in the protection afforded commercial
speech.").
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proach (such as requiring warnings against gambling) might work as
well. 47
The Supreme Court's decisions from the last two decades suggest,
however, substantially greater protection for commercial speech. In
Edenfield v. Fane,4 8 for example, the majority found that a state had
failed to demonstrate a reasonable fit between its broad prophylactic
rule against personal solicitation of clients by certified public accoun-
tants (CPAs) and its conceded interests in ensuring that such commu-
nications were not false, misleading, or coercive.49
The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social
and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and informa-
tion flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital,
some of slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker
and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the
information presented.so
The Court appeared to strengthen the third prong of the Central Hud-
son test, holding that the challenged regulation must advance the gov-
47 See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344 ("The legislature could conclude, as it ap-
parently did here, that residents of Puerto Rico are already aware of the risks of casino
gambling, yet would nevertheless be induced by widespread advertising to engage in
such potentially harmful conduct."); id. at 346 ("[I]t is precisely because the govern-
ment could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is
permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct,
but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising."); id. ("It would ...
surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legislature the
authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority
to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity . . . ."). In a subsequent
similar case, the Court took a decidedly different tack. See Greater New Orleans
Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (invalidating a congressional ban
on all broadcast advertising of casino gambling for failing the third prong of the Cen-
tral Hudson test); id. at 193 (rejecting the greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power
rationale from Posadas).
48 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
49 See id. at 768-69 ("[T]he State may ban commercial expression that is
fraudulent or deceptive without further justification. . . . But where, as with the blan-
ket ban involved here, truthful and nonmisleading expression will be snared along
with fraudulent or deceptive commercial speech, the State must satisfy the remainder
of the Central Hudson test .... ); see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 & n.21 (1993) (explaining that an interest in protecting con-
sumers from "commercial harms" provides "the typical reason why commercial
speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial
speech").
5o Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767.
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ernment interest "in a direct and material way."51 It declined to accept
the state's assertion that in-person solicitation was obviously harmful
and instead required the state to supply evidence to bolster its claim.52
In United States v. Edge Broadcasting Company, by contrast,
the Court showed significant deference in evaluating the constitutio-
nality of a 1934 federal statute restricting broadcasts of lottery adver-
tising on radio and television stations. The law allowed such advertis-
ing only by stations licensed in states that sponsored lotteries.54 After
assuming that the advertising was not misleading, and noting that
Congress' goal of protecting the interests of nonlottery states was sub-
stantial (without ever questioning the weightiness of those states'
presumed interests in guarding against problem gamblers),s the Court
51 Id.; see also id at 771 (explaining that the state "must demonstrate that the
harms it recites are real and that its restrictions will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree"); cf Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'1 Reg., 512 U.S. 136, 141-43, 149
(1994) (overturning a Board of Accountancy order censuring one of its members for
including in her law firm's advertising references to her credentials as a certified
public accountant (CPA) and certified financial planner (CFP)); id. at 143-48 (em-
phasizing that the state had failed to present any evidence that anyone had been
misled by the petitioner's truthful representation of her credentials); id. at 144 ("[A]s
long as Ibanez holds an active CPA license from the Board we cannot imagine how
consumers can be misled by her truthful representation to that effect.").
52 See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771-73, 777; see also Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146
(refusing to "allow rote invocation of the words 'potentially misleading' to supplant
the [government's] burden"); FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315
(1993) (explaining that only on minimum rationality review may a legislative choice
"be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data"). A
couple of years later, in a sharply divided decision that turned largely on conflicting
assessments of the evidence offered in support of the asserted link between ends and
means, the Court upheld a ban on targeted direct mail solicitation of victims within
thirty days of an accident or disaster. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,
635 (1995). The petitioner had submitted a lengthy summary of its two-year study of
lawyer advertising and solicitation containing both statistical and anecdotal data to
demonstrate that the public viewed direct-mail solicitation of accident victims and
their families as intrusive and reflecting poorly on the legal profession. See id. at 626-
28. Aside from questioning the significance of these asserted interests, the dissenting
members of the Court took particular issue with the majority's acceptance of the
Bar's study as evidence of a nexus. See id at 640 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("This
document includes no actual surveys, few indications of sample size or selection
procedures, no explanations of methodology, and no discussion of excluded results.");
id. at 641 ("Our cases require something more than a few pages of self-serving and
unsupported statements by the State to demonstrate that a regulation directly and
materially advances the elimination of a real harm when the State seeks to suppress
truthful and nondeceptive speech."). The majority concluded that the limited prohibi-
tion "targets a concrete, nonspeculative harm." Id. at 629; see also id at 628, 632, 635
(emphasizing that no effort had been made to refute the Bar's study).
s 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
54 See id. at 422-23.
" See id. at 426.
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turned to the nexus elements of the Central Hudson analysis. Under
prong three, it found that the ban directly advanced the government's
interest in accommodating conflicting state lottery policies.5 6 Apply-
ing prong four in a similarly cursory fashion, the Court sustained the
prohibition.
In 1995, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company,58 the Court con-
fronted a constitutional challenge to a statute that prohibited alcohol
content disclosures in labeling. Sixty years earlier, shortly after the
repeal of Prohibition, Congress enacted the Federal Alcohol Adminis-
tration Act (FAAA).59 Among other things, the Act prohibited the
disclosure of alcohol content in the labeling and advertising of malt
beverages.60 At the time of enactment, Congress took note of the dif-
See id. at 428; id. at 434 ("If there is an immediate connection between
advertising and demand, and the federal regulation decreases advertising, it stands to
reason that the policy of decreasing demand for gambling is correspondingly ad-
vanced."). Strangely, in discussing how the statute directly advanced the asserted
governmental goals, the Court cited examples of other possible statutory schemes that
would have a more overinclusive effect (such as banning all lottery advertising na-
tionwide, or forbidding stations in lottery states from carrying lottery advertisements
if their signals reached neighboring nonlottery states). See id. at 428. This type of
argument ordinarily is considered under the fourth prong of the Central Hudson anal-
ysis.
1 See id. at 429-30. In determining that the statute was no more extensive
than necessary to achieve the government's goal, the Court concluded that "applying
the restriction to a broadcaster such as Edge directly advances the governmental inter-
est in enforcing the restriction in nonlottery States, while not interfering with the
policy of lottery States." Id.; see also id. at 434 ("Congress clearly was entitled to
determine that broadcast of promotional advertising of lotteries undermines North
Carolina's policy against gambling, even if the North Carolina audience is not wholly
unaware of the lottery's existence."). But see id. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (com-
plaining that "the United States has selected the most intrusive, and dangerous, form
of regulation possible-a ban on truthful information regarding a lawful activity
imposed for the purpose of manipulating, through ignorance, the consumer choices of
some of its citizens"); id. ("[T]he Federal Government has not regulated the content
of [neighboring State's lottery] advertisements to ensure that they are not misleading,
nor has it provided for the distribution of more speech, such as warnings or educa-
tional information about gambling.").
i 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
' Ch. 814, 49 Stat. 977 (1935) (codified as amended at 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-
219a (2006)).
6 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2), (f)(2) (2006). The Treasury Department's Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF, subsequently renamed the Alcohol and To-
bacco Tax and Trade Bureau) enforces the FAAA. In regulations implementing the
statute, BATF prohibited the disclosure of alcohol content in the labeling and adver-
tising of malt beverages. See 27 C.F.R. § 7.26(a) (1993) ("The alcohol content and the
percentage and quantity of the original extract shall not be stated unless required by
State law."); id. § 7.54(c); see also id. § 7.29(t) (prohibiting the use of words such as
"strong," "extra strength," and "high test"). BATF suspended § 7.26 in order to comp-
ly with the district court's order in Coors enjoining the enforcement of this regulation,
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ficulty in obtaining accurate measurements of alcohol content due to
varying brewing conditions, so it sought to protect consumers from
deception as well as ensure fair competition within the malt beverage
industry. 61 Because modem technology now enables brewers to meas-
ure the alcohol content of their beers very precisely,62 the original
concern that consumers might be misled by inaccurate alcohol content
labeling or advertising has largely disappeared.
In a unanimous decision, and for the first time evaluating product
labeling controls under the Central Hudson test, the Court invalidated
the restriction.63 The government conceded that the proposed alcohol
content disclosure related to a lawful activity and was not mislead-
ing. 4 It claimed that the law prevented brewers from engaging in so-
called "strength wars." The government argued that, if alcohol content
disclosure were permitted, competing brewers would continually in-
crease the alcohol content of their products in an effort to capture a
larger share of the market. 65
and it promulgated an interim regulation permitting the disclosure of alcohol content
on beer labels. See Alcoholic Content Labeling for Malt Beverages; Interim Rule, 58
Fed. Reg. 21,228, 21,232 (Apr. 19, 1993) (codified at 27 C.F.R. § 7.71 (1994)).
61 See Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (10th Cir. 1991)
(quoting House Committee report and describing testimony about the difficulty in
obtaining accurate alcohol content measurements in beer); see also Nat'l Distrib. Co.
v. U.S. Treasury Dep't, 626 F.2d 997, 1004-12 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (detailing the
FAAA's legislative history).
62 See T.M. Dowhanick & I. Russell, Advances in Detection and Identifica-
tion Methods Applicable to the Brewing Industry, in BEER AND WINE PRODUCTION:
ANALYSIS, CHARACTERIZATION, AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES 13 (Barry H. Gump
ed., 1993). Indeed, federal regulations had assumed that, within narrow tolerances,
brewers could accurately measure alcohol content. See, e.g., 27 C.F.R. §§ 5.37(b),
7.26(b) (1993).
63 See Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 491. Only Justice Stevens wrote separate-
ly. See id. at 491-98 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that alcohol con-
tent disclosure restrictions should be evaluated under the test for pure rather than
commercial speech).
6 See id. at 483.
65 See id at 483-84. In effect, Congress aimed to eliminate incentives for
brewers to supply beers containing high alcohol content, and the government argued
that it had in fact succeeded in accomplishing this end. See id. at 488 ("Section
205(e)(2) allegedly relieved competitive pressures to market beer on the basis of
alcohol content, resulting over the long term in beers with lower alcohol levels."); see
also id. at 487 ("Under the Government's theory, § 205(e)(2) suppresses the threat of
such competition by preventing consumers from choosing beers on the basis of alco-
hol content."); id (conceding that "a restriction on the advertising of a product cha-
racteristic will decrease the extent to which consumers select a product on the basis of
that trait"). Although the significance of this interest in the abstract went largely un-
contested, Coors argued that the fear of strength wars was not in fact the true rationale
underlying the governmental policy. See id at 484. In its application of Central Hud-
son's third prong, the Court referenced back to this second prong problem. See id. at
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The Court noted that the government's assertions about the like-
lihood of strength wars arising from alcohol content labeling consisted
mainly of "anecdotal evidence and educated guesses." 66 The govern-
ment demonstrated only a weak connection between alcohol content
labeling and the threat of strength wars in the beer market.6 7 This de-
manding search for evidence of a nexus stood in marked contrast to
the deference previously extended by the Court to congressional
judgments of this sort.68 Indeed, Coors Brewing suggests even less
deference under the third prong than the Court extended to state and
local governments in some of the earlier cases. 69 Thus, the lack of
evidence to support the asserted link between labeling and strength
wars, combined with the irrationality of the regulatory scheme for
alcoholic beverage labeling and advertising,70 led the Court to con-
489 ("[T]hese exemptions and inconsistencies bring into question the purpose of the
labeling ban.").
16 Id. at 490.
67 See id.
68 See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428-30 (1993)
(upholding 1934 federal statute which prohibited broadcasts of lottery advertise-
ments); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539 (1987)
("Congress reasonably could conclude that most commercial uses of the Olympic
words and symbols are likely to be confusing.").
69 See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 342-44
(1986) (deferring to legislative judgment that casino advertising restrictions would
limit gambling by citizens); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509
(1981) (plurality opinion) ("hesitat[ing] to disagree with the accumulated, common-
sense judgments of local lawmakers"); see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986) ("The First Amendment does not require a city ... to
conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by
other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed
to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.").
70 See Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 489 ("[T]he irrationality of this unique
and puzzling regulatory framework ensures that the labeling ban will fail to achieve
[the government's] end."); see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United
States, 527 U.S. 173, 190 (1999) (invalidating a federal ban on broadcast advertising
of lotteries in part because it was "pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies"); id. at
193-94 ("Even under the degree of scrutiny that we have applied in commercial
speech cases, decisions that select among speakers conveying virtually identical mes-
sages are in serious tension with principles underlying the First Amendment."); City
of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994) ("Exemptions from an otherwise legiti-
mate regulation . . . may diminish the credibility of the government's rationale for
restricting speech in the first place."). For example, the statute prohibited alcohol
content labeling on beers, but permitted it on some wines, and affirmatively required
it on distilled liquors and other wines. See Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 488; see also
id. at 488 89 (adding that the government allows brewers to signal high alcohol con-
tent in malt beverages by calling them "malt liquors").
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clude that the FAAA's labeling restriction failed under Central Hud-
son's third prong.n
Finally, in dicta, the Court opined that the prohibition on the dis-
closure of alcohol content in labeling also would fail the fourth prong
of the test. In light of several less restrictive alternatives for minimiz-
ing the threat of strength wars, such as capping the maximum alcohol
content of beers or limiting the prohibition on disclosure to malt liq-
uors, the Court concluded that the regulation was not adequately tai-
lored to the attainment of the government's goal.72 Insofar as it might
have allowed "prohibiting marketing efforts emphasizing high alcohol
strength" as a less restrictive alternative, however, the Court apparent-
ly left open the possibility (as it had done in Central Hudson) that the
government could seek to alter consumers' behavior by denying them
access to truthful and nonmisleading information,7 3 at least so long as
it had pursued the goal more single-mindedly and on the basis of
stronger evidence.
One year after Coors Brewing, the Court struck down a state pro-
hibition against alcohol price advertising. 74 It held unanimously that
the Twenty-First Amendment provided the states with no presumption
of constitutional validity, and all members of the Court seemed to
dismiss the decade-old holding in the gambling case Posadas as an
aberration,75 but in other respects the Justices failed to settle on a ra-
" See Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 486-90.
72 See id at 490-9 1.
73 See id; see also id. at 485 ("[T]he Government here has a significant
interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens by preventing
brewers from competing on the basis of alcohol strength, which could lead to greater
alcoholism and its attendant social costs."). Only Justice Stevens took issue with this
possibility. See id. at 497 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) ("Any 'interest' in
restricting the flow of accurate information because of the perceived danger of that
knowledge is anathema to the First Amendment . . . . One of the vagaries of the
'commercial speech' doctrine in its current form is that the Court sometimes takes
such paternalistic motives seriously.").
74 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507-08, 516
(1996) (plurality opinion).
7 See id at 509-14 ("The reasoning in Posadas does support the State's
argument, but, on reflection, we are now persuaded that Posadas erroneously per-
formed the First Amendment analysis," including its significant deference to a state
legislature's choice of means, its "greater-includes-the-lesser" reasoning, and its
supposed "vice" exception.); id at 513 ("As the entire Court apparently now agrees,
the statements in the Posadas opinion on which Rhode Island relies are no longer
persuasive."); id. at 531-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("The closer look
that we have required since Posadas comports better with the purpose of the analysis
set out in Central Hudson . . . ."); see also Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1087 ("Aside
from the Court's acknowledged mistake in Posadas, few of the Court's commercial
speech decisions have drawn fire because of their results.").
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tionale. In his plurality opinion, Justice Stevens concluded that the
advertising prohibition failed Central Hudson's nexus prongs, finding
inadequate evidence to support the state's claim that its ban on alcohol
price advertising would promote temperance, 76 and pointing out that
the government could more directly have guarded against the fear that
aggressive price competition would generate unhealthy demand.n
In addition, echoing a point that he had made on several previous
occasions, Justice Stevens suggested that outright bans on commercial
speech should be subject to closer constitutional scrutiny: "The First
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that
seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to
be their own good." 78 In a separate concurrence, Justice Thomas
would have gone further still, concluding that the government's as-
serted interest (i.e., "keep[ing] legal users of a product or service igno-
rant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace") was "per
se illegitimate." 79 Justice O'Connor, in an opinion joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Souter and Breyer, concurred in the
76 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504-07.
77 See id. at 507 ("[Hligher [alcohol] prices can be maintained either by
direct regulation or by increased taxation."); see also id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in judgment); id. at 524 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) ("[I]t would seem
that directly banning a product (or rationing it, taxing it, controlling its price, or oth-
erwise restricting its sale in specific ways) would virtually always be at least as effec-
tive in discouraging consumption as merely restricting advertising regarding the
product would be, and thus virtually all restrictions with such a purpose would fail the
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test."); Kathleen Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Ciga-
rettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REv. 123,
141-45. Indeed, an advertising ban could backfire in this respect. See Daniel Helberg,
Comment, Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed Restrictions on Cigarette
Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1219,
1260 (1996) (pointing out that forced reductions in the billions spent annually by the
tobacco industry for advertising could lead to greater price competition, which might
increase purchasing by minors).
7 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503 ("Precisely because bans against truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech rarely seek to protect consumers from either de-
ception or overreaching, they usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that the
public will respond 'irrationally' to the truth."); see also id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part) (sharing an "aversion towards paternalistic governmental policies that
prevent men and women from hearing facts that might not be good for them").
Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); see also id. at 523 (criti-
cizing Justice Stevens' opinion insofar as it "impl[ied] that if the State had been more
successful at keeping consumers ignorant and thereby decreasing their consumption,
then the restriction might have been upheld"). But see Baker, supra note 13, at 1163-
64, 1172-78 (challenging this position); id. at 1174 ("An interest in keeping people in
ignorance would require the law to bar all speech with the specified content [rather
than simply speech by those with a commercial interest].").
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judgment on the narrower ground that the challenged restriction failed
Central Hudson's fourth prong. 80
Five years later, in Lorillard Tobacco Company v. Reilly, the
Court spoke with somewhat greater clarity. It invalidated on First
Amendment grounds state regulations that restricted advertisements
for cigars and smokeless tobacco products within 1,000 feet of a
school or playground (i.e., no outdoor advertising, and indoor adver-
tising could not be visible from outdoors or be placed below five feet
off of the ground).82 The majority declined suggestions that it use
something stricter than the Central Hudson test. Although it recog-
nized that the prevention of underage use of tobacco products quali-
fied as a substantial interest, 84 and it conceded that the state had
enough evidence linking such behavior to advertising, the majority
concluded that the rules were inadequately tailored because the prohi-
bition would have limited adults' access to nonmisleading information
about a lawful activity, especially insofar as application of the 1,000
foot radius limitation would have banned nearly all tobacco advertis-
80 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 532 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judg-
ment) ("Because Rhode Island's regulation fails even the less stringent standard set
out in Central Hudson, nothing here requires adoption of a new analysis for the eval-
uation of commercial speech regulation.").
8' 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
82 See id. at 565-67. The Court invalidated these same restrictions as applied
to cigarettes on grounds of express federal preemption. See id. at 540-53. It upheld
separate regulations prohibiting certain sales practices with regard to cigarettes, ci-
gars, and smokeless tobacco products (e.g., barring self-service displays and promo-
tional giveaways). See id. at 553, 567-70 (explaining that the petitioners had made no
preemption argument and had not fully developed their constitutional objections to
these rules).
83 See id. at 554-55; cf id. at 571-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) ("My continuing concerns that the test gives insufficient
protection to truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech require me to refrain from
expressing agreement with the Court's application of the third part of Central Hud-
son."); id. at 572-90 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(arguing that strict scrutiny should apply because the rules discriminate on the basis
of content, and explaining why they fail); id. at 586-89 (drawing parallels to advertis-
ing for fast foods and alcohol in order to rebut suggestions that tobacco falls into a
class by itself for First Amendment purposes).
84 See id at 555; see also id. at 564 ("The State's interest in preventing unde-
rage tobacco use is substantial, and even compelling . . . ."); id at 570 ("We have
observed that 'tobacco use, particularly among children and adolescents, poses per-
haps the single most significant threat to public health in the United States."' (quoting
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000))). The gov-
ernment failed, however, to make a threshold argument that advertising near schools
and playgrounds promoted an unlawful activity-namely, underage use of tobacco
products.
85 See id. at 556-61.
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ing in the state's major metropolitan areas. It also decided that the
restriction on indoor advertising displays failed the nexus prongs:
"Not all children are less than 5 feet tall, and those who are certainly
have the ability to look up and take in their surroundings."87 Thus, the
inevitable underinclusiveness of a bright line rule proved fatal even
though the Court purported to be engaging in a form of intermediate
scrutiny.
B. Another Pharmacy Case Sets the Current Tone
In 2002, in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, a bare
majority of the Court invalidated a prohibition on advertising by
pharmacists about compounded drugs. Compounding generally refers
to the extemporaneous preparation of pharmaceutical products to meet
the special needs of patients unable to tolerate commercially available
formulations. 8 9 Pharmacists have long engaged in such ad hoc custo-
mization of mass-produced drugs, and, though it technically would
run afoul of requirements that the FDA first issue a license for a new
drug, the agency historically has left the matter to professional regula-
tion at the state level. 90
86 See id. at 561-65 (noting also that the prohibition broadly swept in dis-
plays posted inside of businesses if visible from the outside as well as outdoor oral
communications); see also id. at 571 ("[S]o long as the sale and use of tobacco is
lawful for adults, the tobacco industry has a protected interest in communicating
information about its products and adult customers have an interest in receiving that
information.").
87 Id at 566; see also id. at 567 ("Massachusetts may wish to target tobacco
advertisements and displays that entice children, much like floor-level candy displays
in a convenience store, but the blanket height restriction does not constitute a reason-
able fit with that goal."); id. at 582 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (citing growth charts to indicate that children on average reach five-feet
tall before they turn thirteen years of age). The majority did not offer examples of
better tailored restrictions on the placement of indoor ads, and modifications of the
rule to increase the height restrictions (seven or more feet?) would run into objections
of overinclusiveness insofar as adults of short stature or poor eyesight would no long-
er get to see these messages. Imagine instead that the state had banned all tobacco
advertising without reference to proximity to schools or height of display, and that it
had asserted an interest in protecting adults as well as children-would that also in-
evitably founder constitutionally, though for different reasons?
" 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
89 See id. at 360-61; see also Lars Noah, The Coming Pharmacogenomics
Revolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit Patients' Genetic Profiles, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 1,
19-20 (2002).
90 See W States, 535 U.S. at 362; Edward Epstein, Warning Issued on Prep-
aration of Drugs; Senator Says Pharmacies Must Improve Safety of Hand-mixed
Prescription Medicines, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 24, 2003, at A3.
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Even so, not all compounding fits this benign vision of a local
pharmacist modifying the dosage form of an already approved drug in
the back room-some pharmacies have, for instance, created large
quantities of unauthorized generic knock-offs of branded prescription
products that offer little or no benefit (other than lower price) to pa-
tients with special needs; 91 at the other extreme, rather than offering
minor deviations from already approved formulations, pharmacies
sometimes have created entirely new products. 9 2 As a consequence,
when pharmacies exceed the contours of traditional compounding and
begin to engage in veiled commercialization of unapproved new
drugs, the FDA has taken enforcement action. 93 The agency has
struggled to draw the line between the permissible practice of phar-
macy and impermissible efforts to flout federal licensing require-
ments, eventually announcing its approach to enforcement in 1992 in
Compliance Policy Guide (CPG) No. 7132.16.94 The CPG listed nine
examples of behavior that would raise a red flag, and advertising the
availability of a particular compounded drug appeared at the top of its
list.9s
9 This happened, for instance, with a once popular diet drug. See Fisher v.
Prof l Compounding Ctrs. of Am., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1019-21 (D. Nev. 2004)
(holding the that suppliers of bulk fenfluramine sold for compounding had failed to
ensure that pharmacists knew of the risks associated with this drug substance);
Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 79 P.3d 922 (Utah 2003) (declining to
impose strict liability on a pharmacist who had engaged in such compounding); see
also Tara Parker-Pope, New Controversy over Menopause Hormones, WALL ST. J.,
May 2, 2006, at DI (reporting that the manufacturer of Premproo filed a petition
asking the FDA to crack down on compounded hormone replacement products). Even
when done in response to a critical supply shortage rather than simply as a way to
take advantage of demand for a popular branded product, compounding can result in
serious harm. See Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation's Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling
Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REv. 741, 746 (2003); Erin Hallissy
& Sabin Russell, Who's Mixing Your Drugs, S.F. CHRON., June 23, 2002, at Al.
92 See, e.g., Gordon Fairclough, Some Pharmacies Sell New Nic-Fix-
Lollipops Laced with Nicotine, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2002, at B 1; Linda Marsa, Phar-
macies Stick by Nicotine Pops, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2002, at S3; see also Katie Tho-
mas, Deaths of 21 Polo Horses Highlight Practices of Disputed Pharmacies, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2009, at B12.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Sene X Eleemosynary Corp., 479 F. Supp. 970,
978-79 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (rejecting practice of pharmacy defense to misbranding
charges associated with large-scale compounding); see also United States v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 901 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1990).
94 See Proffs & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 599
(5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a procedural challenge to this policy announcement).
9' See W States, 535 U.S. at 362-63 (quoting from relevant portions of the
CPG).
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Five years later, in connection with sweeping amendments to the
FDA's enabling statute,96 Congress included a special set of provi-
sions designed to make it easier for pharmacists to engage in com-
pounding. In section 127(a) of the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), 97 Congress codified much of
the agency's existing informal policy, though with some modifica-
tions.98 Pharmacists who wished to engage in compounding would not
have to comply with new drug approval (NDA) requirements so long
as, inter alia, they did not advertise the fact that they compounded
particular drug products. Evidently not satisfied with their broader
legislative victory that required accepting some compromises, a group
of pharmacists challenged the advertising restriction as inconsistent
with the First Amendment. The plaintiffs prevailed in the lower
courts,99 though they lost on the question of severability. 00 The gov-
ernment petitioned for certiorari, but the pharmacists failed to cross-
petition on the inseverability holding,'01 which meant that the entire
statutory safe harbor would fall away (leaving them back at the FDA's
mercy) even if they ultimately prevailed on the constitutional issue.' 02
In affirming the lower courts, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
majority, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas,10 3
purported to apply the Central Hudson test. Although all agreed that
96 See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 331-397).
9 Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 127(a), Ill Stat. 2296, 2328 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 353a (2006)).
98 See W. States, 535 U.S. at 364-65 (summarizing the statutory provision).
9 See W. States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (D. Nev. 1999),
aff'd in relevant part, 238 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2001).
100 See W. States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 238 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2001)
(reversing this aspect of the district court's decision). For more on severability analy-
sis, see Lars Noah, The Executive Line Item Veto and the Judicial Power to Sever:
What's the Difference?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 235, 236-41 (1999).
'0' See W States, 535 U.S. at 366.
102 See Lars Noah, Compounding a Constitutional Error? Pharmaceuticals
and Free Speech, HEALTH L. NEWS, Oct. 2002, at 7 ("As a result, they may have won
the battle but lost the war insofar as pharmacists who compound drugs now again face
closer FDA regulation of their activities."). Strangely, in a subsequent decision, a
different federal appellate court found the unconstitutional advertising provision
severable after all. See Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383 (5th Cir.
2008); Jesse M. Boodoo, Note, Compounding Problems and Compounding Confu-
sion: Federal Regulation of Compounded Drug Products and the FDAMA Circuit
Split, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 220 (2010).
103 See W. States, 535 U.S. at 359. Although he joined the majority opinion,
Justice Thomas filed a one paragraph concurring opinion for himself to reiterate his
oft-stated position that commercial speech should receive full protection under the
First Amendment. See id. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring).
the case involved commercial speech,'04 the Court never directly con-
fronted the hybrid nature of the case-namely, did the speech restric-
tion relate to product sales or professional services? The sales-service
distinction, familiar in tort doctrine,' 0 5 also appears to have made
some difference in the how the Court heretofore had resolved com-
mercial speech cases.' 06 Although FDAMA's advertising restriction
straddled the line, the statute appeared to operate primarily on the sale
of a product rather than the rendition of a service.10 7 It lacked, howev-
er, the "vice" aspect of prior cases involving government efforts to
protect citizens from harms associated with gambling or the consump-
tion of alcohol and tobacco products. 108
The Court also failed to appreciate the nature of the unconstitu-
tional conditions problem before it. The majority treated the case as
involving a prohibition on a particular type of speech, noting for in-
i0 See id. at 366; see also id. at 367 ("Neither party has challenged the ap-
propriateness of applying the Central Hudson framework to the speech-related provi-
sions at issue here.").
105 See Lars Noah, Authors, Publishers, and Products Liability: Remedies for
Defective Information in Books, 77 OR. L. REV. 1195, 1203-04 (1998); Noah, supra
note 89, at 24-25 (discussing the distinction in connection with liability for pharmacy
compounding mistakes); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 19(b) (1998) ("Services, even when provided commercially, are not
products."). Interestingly, the electricity at the center of Central Hudson gets special
treatment in products liability doctrine. See id. § 19(a) & cmt. d.
106 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 773 n.25 (1976) (suggesting that advertising about variable professional
services might pose greater dangers of deceptiveness than advertising about standar-
dized products); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and
the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999); R.
Michael Hoefges, Regulating Professional Services Advertising: Current Constitu-
tional Parameters and Issues Under the First Amendment Commercial Speech Doc-
trine, 24 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 953 (2007). For example, the Court emphasizes
speaker interests in professional advertising cases while focusing on listener interests
in other commercial speech settings. In addition, the collateral purposes in profes-
sional advertising cases tend to differ from those involving vice products, putting
aside for the moment their constitutionality. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.
761, 778 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("States have the broader authority to
prohibit commercial speech that, albeit not directly harmful to the listener, is inconsis-
tent with the speaker's membership in a learned profession and therefore damaging to
the profession and society at large.").
107 See infra notes I10-12 and accompanying text.
1o8 Cf Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1069-70 n.89 (noting that "the early com-
mercial speech cases were aimed at state laws that were designed either to stifle com-
petition for professional services or to engage in puritanical social engineering by
discouraging consumers from getting their hands on 'sinful' products, such as alco-
hol, tobacco or contraceptives or wasting money on gambling," adding that "most of
these cases dealt with antiquated statutes and regulations that long pre-dated" the
Court's extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech).
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stance that the respondents "[fjear[ed] that they would be prosecuted
under the FDAMA if they continued to distribute" promotional mate-
rials about specific compounded drugs. 109 Violations of section 127(a)
would not, however, have led to prosecution-instead, deviations
from that provision would have removed FDAMA's special exception
to new drug approval requirements, and pharmacists then would face
the threat of prosecution only if they distributed drugs in violation of
section 505(a) of the FDCA. 110 To put it another way, pharmacists
were as free as anyone else to advertise the availability of particular
drugs so long as they first satisfied product licensing requirements,
and it is the failure to do the latter rather than the desire to do the for-
mer that would have triggered the risk of federal prosecution."' These
are subtle but potentially important differences-perhaps not likely to
alter the Court's ultimate judgment in the case, but critical to appre-
ciating the potentially radical consequences of its decision. 112
" W. States, 535 U.S. at 365; see also id. at 373 (asking "why the Govern-
ment believed forbidding advertising was a necessary as opposed to merely conve-
nient means of achieving its interests" (emphasis added)). This hardly represents the
first time that members of the same Court entirely misunderstood the complicated
operation of the FDCA and its many amendments. See Lars Noah, Inverting the
Products Liability Preemption Defense, HEALTH L. NEWS, Sept. 2001, at 6 ("Rehn-
quist's opinion for the majority [in Buckman v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S.
341 (2001),] emphasized that Congress clearly wanted the Medical Device Amend-
ments of 1976 enforced exclusively by the FDA, but the statutory provision that he
cited for this proposition pre-dated those amendments by almost four decades, and it
applies equally to all of the products regulated by this agency.").
"o See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d), 355(a) (2006); see also United States v. Endotec,
Inc., 563 F.3d 1187, 1198-200 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the statutory "custom
device" exemption from premarket approval requirements becomes inapplicable if the
supplier advertises the availability of the unapproved medical device). Thus, if a
pharmacy advertised that it would soon begin compounding a particular drug but
subsequently decided not to bother, then it has violated no federal law. If it did com-
pound the previously advertised product, then the pharmacy might face charges under
the FDCA for selling an unapproved new drug, and the act of advertising would de-
prive it of an otherwise available defense under FDAMA § 127(a).
' Indeed, though the FDA might initiate enforcement action against a phar-
macist in such circumstances (seeking an injunction or even criminal sanctions), it
instead might initiate a condemnation proceeding against the drug products them-
selves under its seizure authority, with the owner of the inventory entitled to appear as
a claimant in the action. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-334. In fact, in recent years, most
enforcement action charging companies with promoting drugs and devices for off-
label uses have been initiated by different agencies alleging violations of different
statutes (e.g., fraud involving Medicare and Medicaid). See infra note 183.
112 As explained below, the FDA enforces its new drug approval requirements
based on manufacturers' claims (including claims made in advertising) about the uses
of their products, so the sale of a drug approved for one use but advertised for other
uses would violate federal law. See infra Part II.A. More generally, deciding whether
a product qualifies as a "drug" as opposed to a less closely regulated product-i.e.,
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Preliminarily, the majority pointed out that the government made
no argument under Central Hudson's first prong that the prohibited
speech related to unlawful activity or was misleading.113 This thre-
shold concession seems at least mildly curious. It violates federal law
to sell an unapproved new drug.114 Before FDAMA carved out a li-
mited exception for drugs compounded under certain circumstances,
and notwithstanding the FDA's prior policy of turning a blind eye to
the practice, pharmacists who sold unapproved new drugs technically
violated federal law. After the Court struck down section 127(a) (ad-
vertising restriction and all), it again became a violation of federal
law." 5 In short, the underlying conduct (sale of an unapproved new
drug, including one compounded in contravention of FDAMA's nar-
row safe harbor) represented an unlawful activity, so the government
could freely prohibit any advertising about that activity." 6 At most,
device, food additive, food, dietary supplement, tobacco product, cosmetic, or entirely
beyond the FDA's jurisdiction-depends on its "intended use" based primarily on the
information communicated by the seller. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2010); Hanson v.
United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Minn.) (noting that it is "well established that
the 'intended use' of a product, within the meaning of the [FDCA], is determined
from its label, accompanying labeling, promotional claims, advertising, and any other
relevant source"), affd, 540 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976). If the FDA could no longer
indirectly penalize commercial speech by subjecting the products described by such
speech to more rigorous regulatory controls, then most erstwhile therapeutic products
could escape agency licensure requirements altogether and face only the general
prohibitions on misbranding that apply to all FDA-regulated products.
1" See W States, 535 U.S. at 368.
114 See 21 U.S.C. § 33 1(d). Thus, in a subsequent case involving saw palmetto
extract, the FDA prohibited the seller from making any claims that the product treated
benign prostatic hyperplasia unless it first secured a license for what otherwise would
be an unapproved new drug rather than a dietary supplement. See Whitaker v.
Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting First Amendment objec-
tions under the first prong of Central Hudson); see also id. (explaining that the First
Amendment allows "'the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a
crime or to prove motive or intent"' (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,
489 (1993))).
11 See In re Wedgewood Vill. Pharmacy, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 525, 545-50
(D.N.J. 2003) (imposing sanctions after a pharmacy deviated from the FDA's revised
CPG on compounding), aff'd, 421 F.3d 263, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2005).
1' See Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Burzynski, 917 S.W.2d 365, 370-
71 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that articles and brochures about antineoplaston
treatment distributed by a physician to prospective patients qualified as commercial
speech and lost protection under Central Hudson's first prong because the FDA had
not approved the drugs used in this unorthodox cancer therapy); cf Vill. of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982) (upholding a
municipal ordinance that regulated the sale of items intended for use with illicit drugs,
which was discerned in part from an item's proximity at retail to literature encourag-
ing illicit drug use, while emphasizing that the law "does not prohibit or otherwise
regulate the sale of literature itself ... but simply regulates the [sale] of items that the
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section 127(a) posed an unconstitutional conditions problem insofar as
it had predicated the availability of an exception to an existing legal
requirement on the waiver of First Amendment rights." 7 Without get-
ting into that muddle,"' other than to point out that this doctrine
seems out of place in commercial speech cases," 9 one wonders why
the government did not at least make this argument.
Instead, the government used existing requirements for product li-
censure-premised on a thorough evaluation of safety and effective-
labels reveal may be used for an illicit purpose"); id. at 502 ("Flipside displayed the
magazine High Times and books entitled Marituana Grower's Guide, Children's
Garden of Grass, and The Pleasures of Cocaine, physically close to pipes and colored
rolling papers, in clear violation of the guidelines."); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Comm'n Human Rel., 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) ("We have no doubt that a
newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale
of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes.").
17 Another (even more important) exception to this general prohibition exists
to allow the movement of an investigational new drug (IND) in interstate commerce
so that the sponsor may conduct clinical trials necessary to secure approval. See 21
U.S.C. § 355(i). The exception forbids any advertising by IND sponsors. See 21
C.F.R. § 312.7(a) (2010). The Western States decision might jeopardize this
longstanding condition. See George W. Evans & Arnold I. Friede, The Food and
Drug Administration's Regulation of Prescription Drug Manufacturer Speech: A
First Amendment Analysis, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 365, 401-07 (2003); id. at 402
(concluding that "FDA's near-categorical ban on speech about drugs in the approval
pipeline is too broad"); cf Edward T. Highberger, Note, Not So Fast! Scrutinizing the
"Gun Jumping" Provisions of the Securities Act Under the Commercial Speech Doc-
trine, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2141, 2163-71 (2008) (questioning the constitutionali-
ty of a near total prohibition on communications about a proposed securities offering
before filing a registration statement with the SEC).
118 See Lars Noah, Coerced Participation in Clinical Trials: Conscripting
Human Research Subjects, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 359-62 (2010).
"' See Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at "The Greater Includes the Lesser," 55 VAND.
L. REV. 693, 706-08, 726-39, 748-49, 769-71 (2002); id at 739-41 n.163 (defending
the provision challenged in Western States before the Court announced its contrary
decision, adding that "an essential (if somewhat hidden) component of the govern-
ment's argument is that the regulation is not coercive and therefore does not infringe
the First Amendment"); id. at 795 ("If it has reasons to allow the sales [of, for in-
stance, cigarettes or motorcycles] but with misgivings, and if speech by the seller
would exacerbate those legitimate governmental concerns, the state might reasonably
think to offer permission to sell the product on condition that the seller not engage in
the damaging speech."); id. at 796 ("[A] noncoercive offer is not a command, and a
sensible First Amendment doctrine must start by recognizing the difference."); Tho-
mas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, Purchasing, and
Possibly Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1143, 1196-99
(1999); see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
59-60 (2006) (summarizing the application of the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine in a First Amendment context); United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 939 (7th
Cir. 2008) (calling it "a difficult question" where a product manufacturer "struck a
bargain with the FDA in the approval process by promising to limit its promotion").
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ness-as the basis for asserting that it had a substantial interest in li-
miting advertising about compounded drugs that had not undergone
licensing.120 It then apparently made a tactical blunder, however, in
offering another substantial government interest (at least as the major-
ity explained it)-namely, that Congress wanted to ensure that pa-
tients with special needs could access compounded drugs.12 ' The
problem, of course, is that this interest explained FDAMA's safe har-
bor rather than the advertising restriction in particular (indeed, it ran
directly counter to the advertising restriction). This quandary forced
the government to invoke a third substantial interest in finding a bal-
ance between its pair of competing interests,122 which the majority
then could dismiss as a simple exercise in expediency and one readily
accomplished by any number of less restrictive alternatives.123 If noth-
ing else, the Court's evident confusion about the various interests as-
serted by the government indicates the importance of carefully deli-
neating the nature and relative weightiness of the ends sought before
judging the fit between those ends and the selected means of accom-
plishment.
Even accepting at face value the seemingly contrived--or un-
usually candid-account of the conflicting interests at stake, the ma-
jority's application of Central Hudson's nexus prongs fares little bet-
ter. It quibbled with the government's apparent assumption that adver-
tising roughly coincided with the scale of operations and that adver-
tised compounding of particular drugs would indicate activity on a
large enough scale that testing for safety and effectiveness as a pre-
lude to FDA licensure would not prove to be cost prohibitive. 2 4 The
agency does not, however, impose licensing requirements based on
ability to pay. The FDA has prevented individual researchers (and
patients in dire straits) from using investigational products even
though they obviously lacked the financial wherewithal (and time) to
120 See W States, 535 U.S. at 368-69. Although the Court accepted this as a
substantial interest, a few scholars continue to question the value of the agency's
premarket approval process. See Richard A. Epstein, Against Permititis: Why Volun-
tary Organizations Should Regulate the Use of Cancer Drugs, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1
(2009); Richard A. Epstein, The Erosion of Individual Autonomy in Medical Deci-
sionmaking: Of the FDA and IRBs, 96 GEO. L.J. 559 (2008); Richard A. Epstein,
Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vioxx and Celebrex, 5
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICs 741 (2005); Michael I. Krauss, Loosening the
FDA's Drug Certification Monopoly: Implications for Tort Law and Consumer Wel-
fare, 4 GEO. MASON L. REv. 457 (1996).
121 See W States, 535 U.S. at 369-70.
122 See id. at 370.
123 See id. at 371-77.
124 See id. at 371.
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secure approval.12 5 In addition, because even large pharmaceutical
firms will have little incentive to develop products intended to treat
rare conditions, Congress has crafted a number of incentives for so-
called "orphan" drugs,126 but it has not waived normal NDA require-
ments in such situations.
Instead, as the FDA's earlier CPG on the subject had reflected,
advertising of compounded products would provide one of several
indicia that a pharmacist had crossed the line from professional ser-
vice provider (engaged in extemporaneous customization to serve the
genuine needs of a particular patient) to a commercial supplier no
different from any other manufacturer (large or small) of pharmaceut-
ical products who wanted to avoid the hassles associated with getting
FDA permission. In short, it hardly seems crazy to take the position
that the advertising restriction directly advanced the government's
interest in ensuring that this narrow exception from federal licensure
requirements did not swallow the rule (and the far weightier public
health interests served by that rule relative to the arguably then atte-
nuated countervailing interest in assisting patients with special needs
who now would have greater access to compounded drugs even
though unadvertised).
After expressing doubts under the third prong, the majority as-
sumed for the sake of argument that the advertising restriction directly
advanced the government's substantial interest(s).12 7 It then suggested
that any number of non-speech-restrictive alternatives would serve
those interests equally well. "First, it seems that the Government
could use the very factors the FDA relied on to distinguish compound-
ing from manufacturing in its 1992 Guide," 28 presumably except for
the first (advertising) factor. Congress, however, obviously must have
felt that these factors did not quite do the trick. "It might even be suf-
ficient to rely solely on the non-speech-related provisions of the
125 See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. Burzynski
Cancer Research Inst., 819 F.2d 1301, 1304-05 (5th Cir. 1987); Durovic v. Richard-
son, 479 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.1973); Cowan v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240
(N.D. Okla. 1998) (explaining, in the course of rejecting a terminally ill patient's
effort to secure access to an unapproved AIDS drug containing goat neutralizing
antibodies, that "[n]othing in the FDCA or the case law suggests that the exception
[for physicians from the statute's registration requirements] was intended to be ex-
panded to permit doctors to test unapproved drugs"); Garlic v. FDA, 783 F. Supp. 4
(D.D.C.1992) (dismissing challenge to the agency's failure to approve tetrahydroami-
noacrinine brought by patients with Alzheimer's disease).
126 See Lars Noah, Managing Biotechnology's [R]evolution: Has Guarded
Enthusiasm Become Benign Neglect?, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 20-22 (2006).127 See W. States, 535 U.S. at 371.
128 Id. at 372.
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FDAMA . . . ."129 Again, however, Congress evidently viewed the
advertising restriction as a necessary additional limitation on the ex-
ception; indeed, the unappealed inseverability holding reinforces the
notion that Congress regarded these various restrictions as an essential
package.130
The Court chided the government for failing to explain why these
numerous non-speech-restrictive alternatives would fail to serve its
purposes: "If the First Amendment means anything, it means that re-
gulating speech must be a last-not first-resort. Yet here it seems to
have been the first strategy the Government thought to try."' The
majority showed little evident appreciation of the practical limitations
associated with its preferred regulatory options. Although mere ease
of enforcement obviously would fail to justify an overbroad restriction
on commercial speech,132 a carefully tailored restriction that facili-
129 Id
"3 See id. at 379-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In contrast, one year earlier, the
Court had objected to legislation that singled out commercial speech for compulsion,
see United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410-12, 414-16 (2001); see
also Pac. Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (invalidating
requirement that utility distribute speech of other parties when mailing bills to cus-
tomers), after it previously had sustained a similar compelled speech requirement
when part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme, see Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469-70, 474-77 (1997). The latest decision in this line of
cases found no merit, however, to the constitutional objections. See Johanns v. Lives-
tock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (upholding generic advertising campaign
requirement as involving government speech); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
Shewry, 384 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding state's antismoking campaign
financed by a tax on tobacco products), amended, 423 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2005); Kara
O'Conner Gansmann, Note, Government Speech. It's What's for Dinner: Navigating
First Amendment Assertions and Generic Commercial Advertisements Funded by
Checkoff Subsidies, 82 N.D. L. REV. 519 (2006).
' W. States, 535 U.S. at 373. The majority's unforgiving application of the
nexus requirement approaches the least restrictive means test normally reserved for
strict scrutiny cases and demands a probably unattainable level of legislative preci-
sion. After briefly responding to each of the suggested alternatives, the dissent
emphasized that none of the parties to the litigation had argued that any of these non-
speech-restrictive options would have sufficed. See id. at 385-86 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing).
132 See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) ("If [case-
by-case enforcement] is not the most efficient means of preventing fraud, we reaffirm
simply and emphatically that the First Amendment does not permit the State to sacri-
fice speech for efficiency."); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626, 649 (1985) ("The experience of the FTC is, again, instructive.... Given the
possibility of policing the use of illustrations in advertisements on a case-by-case
basis, the prophylactic approach taken by Ohio cannot stand .... ); Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571 n.13 (1980) (suggest-
ing a screening procedure for advertisements as less restrictive than a flat prohibi-
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tated compliance monitoring should not fail simply because harder to
enforce non-speech alternatives might partly serve the government's
purposes. After all, FDAMA did not prevent pharmacists from adver-
tising the fact that they offered compounding services;'1 33 it only pro-
hibited references to the availability of particular products, a more
narrowly tailored speech restriction than a flat prohibition on any
promotional messages about compounding. The majority countered,
however, by noting that pharmacists could not even advertise the
availability of particular compounded drugs to physicians who might
encounter patients with special needs. 134
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, would have sustained the
advertising restriction. 135 They further muddled the effort to identify
the central interest underlying the advertising restriction by imagining
a closely related but distinctive one-and, according to the majority,
one never presented by the government.1 36 The dissent viewed the
prohibition on advertising particular compounded drugs as a congres-
sional effort to guard against generating excess demand among pa-
tients-in the sense that many patients do not in fact have special
needs that require access to a compounded drug-who then would ask
their physicians to prescribe one of these unnecessary and potentially
dangerous products. 137 Under the dissent's analysis, it would not re-
tion); Novartis Corp. v. FTC, 223 F.3d 783, 789 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to a corrective advertising order for a nonprescription drug).
133 See W States, 535 U.S. at 387 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 389
(adding that physicians "obtain information about individual drugs through many
other channels").
134 See id. at 376-77 (majority opinion). "For example, a pharmacist serving a
children's hospital where many patients are unable to swallow pills would be pre-
vented from telling the children's doctors about a new development in compounding
that allowed a drug that was previously available only in pill form to be administered
another way." Id. at 377 ("The fact that the FDAMA would prohibit such seemingly
useful speech even though doing so does not appear to directly further any asserted
governmental objective confirms our belief that the prohibition is unconstitutional.").
"3 See id. at 378, 390 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 388 ("The Court,
in my view, gives insufficient weight to the Government's regulatory rationale, and
too readily assumes the existence of practical alternatives. It thereby applies the
commercial speech doctrine too strictly."). The fact that Justice Stevens joined this
opinion seems odd given his repeated and emphatic invocation of the anti-paternalism
principle in previous commercial speech cases.
136 See id. at 373-74 (majority opinion).
137 See id. at 379-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 380 ("Where an individual
has a specific medical need for a specially tailored drug those risks [associated with
the lack of premarket testing] are likely offset. But where an untested drug is a con-
venience, not a necessity, that offset is unlikely to be present."); id. at 382
("[I]ndividualized consideration is more likely present, and convenience alone is
more likely absent, when demand for a compounding prescription originates with a
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quire much of an additional step to sustain the constitutionality of
prohibitions on direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of prescrip-
tion drugs more generally.' 3 8
The majority offered a pointed rejoinder to this rationale: "Aside
from the fact that this concern rests on the questionable assumption
that doctors would prescribe unnecessary medications . . . , [it]
amounts to a fear that people would make bad decisions if given truth-
ful information about compounded drugs."139 The dissent unsuccess-
fully countered by invoking public health rationales.14 0 Thus, notwith-
standing the Court's occasional prior suggestions that the government
could restrict commercial speech in order to dampen demand or serve
other collateral purposes, the majority unmistakably reaffirmed the
anti-paternalism conception of the First Amendment first expressed in
Virginia Pharmacy. The majority added that, in any event, the adver-
tising prohibition, which equally limited information supplied to pa-
tients with special needs and those without (and to patients as well as
doctor, not an advertisement. The [various existing federal and state advertising]
restrictions try . . . to diminish the likelihood that those who do not genuinely need
untested compounded drugs will not receive them."); id. at 383 ("There is considera-
ble evidence that consumer oriented advertising will create strong consumer-driven
demand for a particular drug... . And there is strong evidence that doctors will often
respond affirmatively to a patient's request for a specific drug that the patient has seen
advertised.").
138 See infra Part II.B.
"9 W States, 535 U.S. at 374 ("We have previously rejected the notion that
the Government has an interest in preventing the dissemination of truthful commer-
cial information in order to prevent members of the public from making bad decisions
with the information.").
140 See id at 387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[C]onsequences flow from the
adverse cumulative effects of multiple individual decisions each of which may seem
perfectly reasonable considered on its own. The Government fears that, taken togeth-
er, these apparently rational individual decisions will undermine the safety testing
system, thereby producing overall a net balance of harm."); id (FDAMA "forbids
advertising the specific drug in question, not because [the Government] fears the
'information' the advertisement provides, but because it fears the systematic effect,
insofar as advertisements solicit business, of advertisements that will not fully explain
the complicated risks at issue."); id. at 388 ("[R]estrictions on commercial speech ...
often reflect a democratically determined governmental decision to regulate a com-
mercial venture in order to protect, for example, the consumer, the public health,
individual safety, or the environment."); id. at 389 ("[Aln overly rigid 'commercial
speech' doctrine will transform what ought to be a legislative or regulatory decision
about the best way to protect the health and safety of the American public into a con-
stitutional decision prohibiting the legislature from enacting necessary protections.");
see also id. at 379 (complaining that the majority "seriously undervalues the impor-
tance of the Government's interest in protecting the health and safety of the American
public"); id. at 384 ("Of course, the added risks in any such individual case may be
small. But those individual risks added together can significantly affect the public
health.").
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their physicians), swept far too broadly to serve the interest pro-
pounded by the dissent. 141
As an exercise in constitutional jurisprudence, Western States
hardly broke new ground, at least not superficially. The members of
the Court evaluated the case using a well-worn form of intermediate
scrutiny,142 differing in their respective assessments of whether the
government had demonstrated a sufficient nexus between the means
selected and its asserted interest in preventing the risks associated
with the commercialization of unapproved new drugs under the guise
of pharmacy compounding. The decision did stand out as the first time
that the Supreme Court invalidated a recently enacted congressional
restriction on advertising, thereby showing little deference to the
judgments of a coordinate branch of government. It certainly solidi-
fied a trend evident during the previous decade of taking seriously the
constitutional rights of entities wishing to engage in commercial
speech,14 3 especially insofar as the Court sub silentio applied the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine.
In some ways, the FDA's reaction to the Court's decision in
Western States represented the most startling aspect of this litigation.
Instead of a grudging response, the agency took it as an occasion to
reconsider its entire approach to regulation. Less than three weeks
after the Court announced its decision, the FDA published a notice
141 See id. at 375-76 (majority opinion). "Although the advertising ban may
reduce the demand for compounded drugs from those who do not need the drugs, it
does nothing to prevent such individuals from obtaining compounded drugs other
than requiring prescriptions." Id. at 376 ("[I]f it is appropriate for the statute to rely on
doctors to refrain from prescribing compounded drugs to patients who do not need
them, it is not clear why it would not also be appropriate to rely on doctors to refrain
from prescribing compounded drugs to patients who do not need them in a world
where advertising was permitted."). The dissent responded that none of the parties to
the litigation had addressed this aspect of the advertising restriction. See id. at 389-90
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The respondents here focus their attack almost entirely upon
consumer-directed advertising. They have not fully addressed separate questions
involving the effect of advertising restrictions on information received by physicians.
I would consequently leave these questions in abeyance.").
142 See id. at 367-68 (majority opinion) ("Although several Members of the
Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it should
apply in particular cases, . . . there is no need in this case to break new ground.").
143 See Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1070 ("By the mid-1990s, the Court had
begun to ratchet up the standard of review considerably, and the caution that marked
the Court's early commercial speech cases began to disappear.. .. Remarkably absent
from the early cases is any discussion of the expressive rights of the commercial
speaker."); id at 1072 ("The Court's recent decisions in Lorillard and Western States
underscore just how dramatic the shift has been.... In both cases, the Court gave
serious consideration to the [commercial] speakers' rights of self-expression and
found that they outweighed the consumer protection goals of the restraints.").
HEALTH M4TRIX
inviting public comments on a series of questions that implied it might
welcome suggestions favoring the deregulation of labeling and adver-
tising.'" This represented a dramatic about-face for an agency that
previously had taken the position that it need not concern itself with
the First Amendment.145 Although perhaps an admirable act of self-
examination, nothing ever came of the FDA's remarkable proposal to
get out of the business of controlling the dissemination of informa-
146tion.
Western States has received scant attention from commentators.14 7
Only after cutting through the majority's simplistic description of (or
144 See Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg.
34,942 (May 16, 2002); see also Marc Kaufman, FDA Seeks Public Comment on
Rules' Constitutionality: Advocates Worry Agency Might Loosen Its Oversight,
WASH. POST, May 15, 2002, at A25; Gina Kolata, Stung by Courts, F.D.A. Rethinks
Its Rules, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 2002, at Fl. It took another three weeks before the
FDA responded to the Court's more limited holding by issuing a revised guidance
document to govern pharmacy compounding. See Pharmacy Compounding Com-
pliance Policy Guide, 67 Fed. Reg. 39,409 (June 7, 2002).
145 See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (calling "al-
most frivolous" the FDA's argument that health claims for dietary supplements were
inherently misleading); Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 85
(D.D.C. 1999) (calling "preposterous" the FDA's argument that FDAMA need not
comply with the First Amendment because it affirmatively permits truthful speech),
vacated in part and appeal dismissed, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Wash. Legal
Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 59 (D.D.C. 1998) ("This court is hard pressed
to believe that the agency is seriously contending that 'promotion' of an activity is
conduct and not speech, or that 'promotion' is entitled to no First Amendment protec-
tion."), order amended by 36 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19-20 (D.D.C. 1999), order amended
sub nom. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81; id. at 66 (dismissing as "tautological" the FDA's
argument that off-label promotion gets no constitutional protection because it violates
statute); see also id at 67 ("In asserting that any and all scientific claims about ...
prescription drugs are presumptively untruthful or misleading until the FDA has had
the opportunity to evaluate them, FDA exaggerates its overall place in the universe.").
146 For example, in subsequently revising the format and content requirements
for prescription drug labeling, the agency offered a brief constitutional defense with-
out ever mentioning Western States. See Requirements on Content and Format of
Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922,
3964 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314 & 601 (2010)).
147 For example, one fairly comprehensive and generally quite interesting
article published more than five years after Western States included only a pair of
brief references to the decision as part of string citations. See Charles Fischette, A
New Architecture of Commercial Speech Law, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 663, 674
n.60 (2008) (noting parenthetically just that the Court "appl[ied] Central Hudson to
strike down restrictions on commercial speech"); id at 712 n.202 (citing Justice
Thomas' concurrence). Indeed, scholars have paid far greater attention to the Court's
decision not to decide a commercial speech case argued during the following Term.
See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Landmark Free-Speech Case
That Wasn 't: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 965 (2004) (intro-
ducing a symposium issue devoted to that case); Cecil C. Kuhne 111, Testing the Outer
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perhaps failure to comprehend) the complex regulatory regime can
one appreciate the potentially far-reaching consequences of the deci-
sion. Although the FDA's initial reaction to Western States came
across as little more than a cynical political exercise,14 8 and the agen-
cy's subsequent inattention to the Supreme Court's broader command
seemed entirely predictable, the robust version of commercial free
speech doctrine that seems to prevail today could profoundly impinge
upon the FDA's (and other agencies') preferred methods for promot-
ing the public's health.
II. PUZZLES INVOLVING THERAPEUTIC PRODUCT
PROMOTION
Medical technologies pose distinctive problems under the First
Amendment. In contrast to vice products (such as alcohol, tobacco,
and junk foods) that often attract the attention of courts and commen-
tators, sellers of prescription drugs and devices do not direct their
pitches to children (where one would expect a paternalistic re-
sponse) 149 or rely primarily on image advertising (or cartoon charac-
Limits of Commercial Speech: Its First Amendment Implications, 23 REV. LITIG. 607
(2004) (focusing on Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, never once even mentioning Western States).
It seems that only those commentators steeped in FDA matters (rather than the First
Amendment) have given Western States any sustained attention. See, e.g., Marsha N.
Cohen, Can We Talk -About Food and Drug Regulation and the First Amendment?,
58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 741, 741-42 (2003) (reacting to the immediately preceding
issue of the same journal, which was entirely devoted to the subject); id. at 748-55
(evaluating the Court's opinion); Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Regulation and the Con-
stitution After Western States, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 901 (2003) (offering an extended
but unsophisticated discussion of the decision).
148 A couple of lawyers who had served as deputy commissioners of policy at
the FDA during the Clinton administration saw it this way. See William B. Schultz &
Michael R. Taylor, Op-Ed., Hazardous Hucksters; When It Comes to Public Health,
Some Limits on Advertising Are Necessary, WASH. PosT, May 28, 2002, at A17 (cha-
racterizing the agency's request for comments as "a direct outgrowth of a movement
led by conservative judges, academics and advocacy groups who argue that the First
Amendment limits the government's power to regulate advertising, even when impor-
tant public health interests are at stake"); see also Lars Noah, The Little Agency That
Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL
L. REv. 901, 923 (2008) ("[W]hen it happens to suit the purposes of the incumbent
administration, the FDA has seemed overly attentive to possible constitutional limits
on its authority-one might say that this amounts to a selective preoccupation with
constitutional constraints to justify indifference to statutory directives.").
149 Cf Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91,
105 (1990) (plurality opinion) ("We reject the paternalistic assumption that the reci-
pients of petitioner's letterhead are no more discriminating than the audience for
children's television."); Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children from Speech, 57 FLA.
L. REV. 565 (2005) (focusing on the regulation of noncommercial speech). But cf
Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV.
ters) to convey their messages. 50 Although hardly dull, print and
broadcast ads for this class of products communicate far more in the
way of information than one finds in efforts to promote beer or fast
food.15 ' Prescription restrictions also mean that laypersons cannot
thoughtlessly act upon advertisements for the latest pharmaceutical
product, and marketing geared toward the physician intermediaries
who must authorize patient access confronts a far more sophisticated
audience. In short, by dint of the nature of medical technologies, the
mechanisms for accessing them, and the extensive regulations that
currently govern their marketing, commercial speech in this area tends
to be more information-laden than typical of other industries.152
839, 849-50 & n.42, 903-04 (2009) (suggesting parallels between patients and child-
ren in order to make sense of specialized tort doctrines governing prescription prod-
ucts).
1so See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce and Communica-
tion, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697, 710-27 (1993) (claiming that most advertising is devoid of
informational content); Sarah C. Haan, Note, The "Persuasion Route" of the Law:
Advertising and Legal Persuasion, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1281, 1284-305 (2000)
(same). But see Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment:
A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. REV. 777, 794-
800 (1993) (challenging the accuracy of this descriptive thesis); Daniel E. Troy, Ad-
vertising: Not "Low Value" Speech, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 85 (1999) (same).
15 See Mike Mitka, Researchers Critical of TV Drug Ads, 297 JAMA 939,
939-40 (2007); Dan Neil, Warning: New Drug Commercials May Cause Drowsiness,
L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at Bl. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S.
60 (1983), the Court held that a federal law prohibiting unsolicited mailings was
unconstitutional when applied to a pharmaceutical company distributing information-
al pamphlets about contraceptives. It recognized that such materials-containing
information related to public health matters-deserved a high degree of protection
under the Constitution. See id at 69 ("[W]here ... a speaker desires to convey truth-
ful information relevant to important social issues such as family planning and the
prevention of venereal disease, we have previously found the First Amendment inter-
est served by such speech paramount.").
152 Vocal critics of the commercial speech doctrine seem blissfully unaware
of these fundamental differences. For instance, one recent article promised a "closer
examination of marketing practices and their ties to events in several specific areas-
business reporting, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, and others." Tamara R. Piety, Against
Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2585 (2008); see
also id. at 2591 ("The commercial speech doctrine has suffered from far too little
reference to the actual practice of advertising . . . ."). Ten pages later, Ms. Piety de-
voted precisely two sentences and a footnote to describe an alleged incident of indi-
rect off-label promotion of an antidepressant to physicians, based entirely on a single
obscure Internet-based news source. See id at 2595-96 & n.48 (citing an article from
something called "Corpwatch"). Almost eighty pages later, after a harangue directed
against the usual stable of other (non-pharma) corporate miscreants (e.g., Enron and
Philip Morris), she offered the following rhetorical question: "Do we really want
GlaxoSmithKline to have a First Amendment defense to its efforts to market Paxil for
off-label uses?" Id. at 2674. Although an intriguing question, it hardly admits of the
obvious answer that she seems to assume.
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The sections that follow focus on different prohibitions-some
longstanding, some recently proposed, and some just imagined-on
communicating information about prescription drugs and devices. In
each case, plausible public health rationales support the prohibitions,
but questions arise about where to situate the line between commercial
and noncommercial speech and whether, even as commercial speech
regulations, such restrictions can survive under the Supreme Court's
current test. To make a long story short, Western States leaves out-
right prohibitions designed to dampen demand (or to serve other colla-
teral purposes) vulnerable to constitutional invalidation, while more
limited restrictions or disclosure requirements designed to guard
against potentially misleading promotional messages would seem to
survive. 153 As the Court has made abundantly clear, however, "mis-
leading" does not have a capacious meaning-if the concept encom-
passed fears that truthful information might "lead persons astray,"
then demand dampening to promote the public health would seem to
pass muster. 154 Instead, because "mislead" connotes a more limited
concern about the potential for information to "deceive,"' 55 the First
153 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002) ("Even if
the Government did argue that it had an interest in preventing misleading advertise-
ments, this interest could be satisfied by the far less restrictive alternative of requiring
each compounded drug to be labeled with a warning that the drug had not undergone
FDA testing and that its risks were unknown."); see also Peel, 496 U.S. at 109 (plu-
rality opinion) (noting the "presumption favoring disclosure over concealment");
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 652 n.14 (1985) ("[A]ll our
discussions of restraints on commercial speech have recommended disclosure re-
quirements as one of the acceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual suppression
of speech."); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 772 n.24 (1976) (suggesting that it may be "appropriate to require that a com-
mercial message . . . include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers,
as are necessary to prevent [commercial speech from] being deceptive").
154 See Gostin & Javitt, supra note 1, at 563-66; see also Ass'n Nat'l Adver-
tisers v. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. 747, 756 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (explaining that "a legisla-
tive body cannot justify its restrictions on commercial speech simply by declaring that
marketing claims are misleading"), aff'd, 44 F.3d 726, 731-32 (9th Cir. 1994).
155 These terms suffer, of course, from their own ambiguities. See Zauderer,
471 U.S. at 645 ("[D]istinguishing deceptive from nondeceptive advertising in vir-
tually any field of commerce may require resolution of exceedingly complex and
technical factual issues and the consideration of nice questions of semantics."); Bates
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) ("recogniz[ing] that many of the problems in
defining the boundary between deceptive and nondeceptive advertising remain to be
resolved"); Ivan L. Preston, The Definition of Deceptiveness in Advertising and Other
Commercial Speech, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 1035 (1990); Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends
on What the Meaning of "False" Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in Commercial
Speech Doctrine, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 227, 248 (2007) ("illustrat[ing] the vast range
of situations in which truth and falsity, even for a single term, are hotly contested").
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Amendment allows the government to guard against the dissemination
of false or deceptive commercial speech but not much else.
A. Protecting Physicians from Getting Duped by Product
Placements?
Once a new drug or medical device receives marketing clearance
from the FDA, manufacturers may promote it only for the indications
set forth in the approved labeling.' 56 Physicians, however, remain free
to use these therapeutic products for other purposes.' As with phar-
macy compounding, off-label uses of approved drugs may run the
gamut, from fairly minor deviations from specified dosing to usage in
treatment of entirely different conditions. "' Even when used for unla-
beled indications, off-label uses might range from the standard of care
in the medical community,159 or acts of desperation by physicians who
156 See Southern v. Pfizer, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1213 (N.D. Ala. 2006)
(accepting guilty plea to criminal charges for off-label promotion of Neurontin' (ga-
bapentin)); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) (2010) (advertising may not "recommend or
suggest any use that is not in the labeling accepted in such approved new-drug appli-
cation or supplement"); id. § 202.1(e)(6)(i)&(xi); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-08-835, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA's OVERSIGHT OF THE PROMOTION
OF DRUGS FOR OFF-LABEL USES (2008); Chris Adams, FDA Cites Firms for Improper
Statements, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2001, at B6 ("In at least nine recent cases, the
[FDA] cited companies for improper statements or other presentations allegedly made
by company representatives working the booths at medical conferences."); Natasha
Singer, Maker of Botox Settles Inquiry on Off-Label Use, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2010,
at Al (reporting that Allergan agreed to pay $600 million in fines, and adding that
three other drug manufacturers charged with off-label promotion recently entered into
settlements for $520 million, $1.41 billion, and $2.3 billion).
15 See Buckman v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350-51 & n.5
(2001); United States v. Algon Chem., Inc., 879 F.2d 1154, 1163 (3d Cir. 1989); 21
C.F.R. § 312.2(d) (2010); Proposed New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic Drug Product
Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,720, 26,733 (June 9, 1983).
158 See Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drug
Products, 16 J. PRODS. & ToxICs LIAB. 139, 140-41 (1994); Randall S. Stafford,
Regulating Off-Label Drug Use-Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1427, 1427 (2008); Bernadette Tansey, Why Doctors Prescribe Off Label, S.F.
CHRON., May 1, 2005, at A12.
159 See James M. Beck & Elizabeth Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed
Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 85 (1998);
Fran Kritz, FDA Seeks to Add Drugs' Use to Labels, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1994, at
Fl 1; see also Bell v. Maricopa Med. Ctr., 755 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)
(alleging malpractice for the failure to use an approved drug for an off-label use);
Bridges v. Shelby Women's Clinic, 323 S.E.2d 372, 374-76 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(same); cf O'Brien v. Angley, 407 N.E.2d 490, 492-94 (Ohio 1980) (holding that, in
a malpractice claim against a physician who exceeded the drug's recommended dose,
the trial judge erred in admitting into evidence an editorial from a medical journal
explaining that best medical practice often requires disregarding prescription drug
labeling).
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encounter patients with special needs not amenable to treatment with
other available drugs, 160 to ad hoc experimentation,161 or dangerous
misuses of drugs prompted by surreptitious marketing efforts by their
manufacturers.162 The constitutional question asks whether and to
what extent the government may guard against the last-mentioned
possibility by broadly prohibiting the dissemination of truthful infor-
mation even in connection with the other less worrisome possibilities.
In the early 1990s, the FDA became concerned that some manu-
facturers were indirectly promoting off-label uses, for instance by
sponsoring continuing medical education (CME) programs and scien-
tific symposia featuring discussions about such uses of their products
and by providing health care professionals with "enduring materials"
(i.e., textbooks or reprints of published articles) mentioning such uses.
In addition to bringing enforcement actions against particular compa-
nies, the agency issued a "draft policy statement" in 1992 to inform
the industry that it might regard such activities as unlawful product
promotions unless certain steps were taken to ensure editorial inde-
pendence.16 3 Although characterized at the time as a "safe harbor,"
16o See Noah, supra note 149, at 857 ("[T]here always might be at least one
hypothetical patient who does not tolerate or mysteriously fails to respond to every
other alternative treatment in whom a reasonable physician-at a loss for any other
ideas-would try a particular drug."); see also David C. Radley et al., Off-label Pre-
scribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1025
(2006) (finding "that about 21% of all estimated uses for commonly prescribed medi-
cations were off-label, and that 15% of all estimated uses lacked scientific evidence of
therapeutic efficacy"); Sandra G. Boodman, Off Label, Off Base? Many Drug Uses
Don't Rest on Strong Science, WASH. POST, May 23, 2006, at F 1.
161 See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between
Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 391-92, 397-400
(2002); Elizabeth Bernstein, A New Breed of "Diet" Pills: Drugs Approved for Di-
abetes, Depression, Epilepsy Grow Popular for Their Weight-Loss Side Effects,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2006, at DI; Bernadette Tansey, A Patient's Right to Know:
How Much Should Doctors Disclose About Treatments Not Approved by the FDA?,
S.F. CHRON., May 1, 2005, at Al.
162 See Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-
Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L.
REv. 181, 206-07 (1999); Jeff Donn, Are We Taking Too Many Drugs?, NEWSDAY,
Apr. 19, 2005, at B 13 ("[T]he Centers for Disease Control voiced concern about huge
off-label growth of antidepressants to treat such loosely defined syndromes as com-
pulsion, panic or anxiety and PMS."); see also News Release, FDA Warns of Risks
with Unapproved Use of Malaria Drug Qualaquin: Serious Side Effects Reported
When Used to Treat or Prevent Night Time Leg Cramps (July 8, 2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm218383.htm;
infra note 190.
163 See Draft Policy Statement on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educa-
tional Activities, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,412 (Nov. 27, 1992); see also Citizen Petition Re-
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these announcements were part of a crack-down on perceived industry
excesses rather than an enlightened effort to liberalize existing prohi-
bitions that seemed unduly restrictive.
The draft policy statement evolved into a pair of "draft guidance"
documents on enduring materials published in 1995,165 which were
finalized one year later,'66 and into a "final guidance" document on
CME programs published in 1997.16' Although not formally binding,
even in their final form,' 68 these various FDA guidance documents
unmistakably were designed to alter the behavior of pharmaceutical
and medical device companies. Only after Congress intervened, by
including a special provision in FDAMA,16 9 did the FDA bother to
garding the FDA's Policy on Promotion of Unapproved Uses of Approved Drugs and
Devices; Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820 (Nov. 18, 1994).
See Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 34 (D.D.C. 1995)
(holding the draft policy statement ripe for review, noting that the FDA might "threat-
en[] (but never actually initiatfe]) enforcement procedures against companies which
failed to comply with the agency's defacto policy"); see also id. at 36 ("[F]ew if any
companies are willing to directly challenge the FDA in this manner. . . .
[M]anufacturers are most reluctant to arouse the ire of such a powerful agency.");
Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations
of Authority, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 873, 922 ("Arm-twisting succeeds, and evades judi-
cial or other scrutiny, in part because companies in pervasively regulated industries
believe that they cannot afford to resist agency demands.").
165 See Advertising and Promotion; Draft Guidances, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,471
(Dec. 6, 1995).
i6 See Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct. 8,
1996).
167 See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational
Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997).
See, e.g., id at 64,094 n. 1 ("This guidance represents the Agency's current
thinking ... and does not operate to bind FDA or the industry . . . ."); see also Lars
Noah, The FDA's New Policy on Guidelines: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too,
47 CATH. U. L. REv. 113, 140-42 (1997) (criticizing the agency's practice of not
taking definitive positions in guidance documents and, thereby, attempting to escape
judicial review).
"9 See Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 4 01(a), Il 1 Stat. 2296, 2356-64 (1997) (codi-
fled at 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa (2006)). FDAMA did not address CME programs, and the
agency published its final guidance on that subject just one month after enactment of
the legislation. See supra note 167. FDAMA did, however, contain another curious
provision affecting commercial speech about therapeutic products. Historically, the
FDA strictly limited the use of comparative efficacy claims. See Peter J. Neumann et
al., The FDA and Regulation of Cost-Effectiveness Claims, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1996,
at 54, 59-61 (criticizing the agency's traditional demand for randomized controlled
trials to substantiate so-called "pharmacoeconomic" claims). In 1997, Congress libe-
ralized these restrictions by allowing drug and device companies to disseminate
"health care economic information" so long as it is based on "competent and reliable
scientific evidence." Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 114(a), Ill Stat. 2296, 2312 (1997)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2006)); see also Note, Will Health Care Economic
Information Lead to Therapeutic-Class Warfare or Welfare?, 111 HARv. L. REV.
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undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking to promulgate formally
binding requirements to control the dissemination of enduring mate-
rials describing off-label uses of drugs and medical devices. 170 After
some constitutional skirmishing in the lower courts,171 the FDA
adopted an interpretation designed to narrow the effect of these
rules.172 After the FDAMA provision sunset in 2006,173 the agency
issued a new (nonbinding) guidance document to replace the inopera-
tive regulations governing the dissemination of enduring materials. 174
2384 (1998). Manufacturers could not, however, provide pharmacoeconomic infor-
mation to individual health care professionals because of congressional concerns that
physicians would not have the time or skill needed to interpret research on the cost
effectiveness of drugs. See H.R. REP. No. 105-310, at 65 (1997); see also Anna W.
Mathews, Detective Work: Reading the Fine Print, Insurers Question Studies of
Drugs, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2005, at Al.
170 See Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed
Drugs, Biologics, and Devices, 63 Fed. Reg. 64,556 (Nov. 20, 1998) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 99 (2005)).
17 See Lars Noah, What's Wrong with "Constitutionalizing Food and Drug
Law"?, 75 TUL. L. REV. 137, 139-40 (2000). Unlike the FDAMA provision at issue
in Western States, which created a genuine safe harbor for pharmacy compounding, it
was disingenuous to similarly characterize the provision allowing limited distribution
of enduring materials discussing off-label uses. See id at 146-48. In practice, it
seems, industry rarely used this exception. See Agency Information Collection Activi-
ties; Submission for Office of Management and Budget Review; Comment Request;
Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed Drugs, Biolog-
ics, and Devices, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,708, 56,709 (Sept. 28, 2005) (estimating that the
FDA would receive less than a dozen regulatory filings annually under 21 C.F.R. pt.
99 based "on the average of the total number of required submissions received during
2002, 2003, and 2004").
172 See Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg.
14,286 (Mar. 16, 2000). Although the appellate court had left parts of Judge Lam-
berth's injunction in place, see Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 334 n.4
& 337 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2000), on remand he concluded that nothing remained of his
original order, see Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 128 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15 (D.D.C.
2000); cf id ("[T]he issue remains 100% unresolved, and the country's drug manu-
facturers are still without clear guidance as to their permissible conduct. To say that
FDA's March 16, 2000 Notice finally clarifies the situation is a farce; the Notice
specifically invites a constitutional challenge to each and every one of its enforcement
actions.").
173 See Draft Guidance for Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the Distri-
bution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications
on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical
Devices; Availability, 73 Fed. Reg. 9342 (Feb. 20, 2008); see also Gardiner Harris,
F.D.A. Seeks to Broaden Range of Use for Drugs, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 2008, at Cl
(discussing conflicting reactions to the proposal). The relatively short comment pe-
riod suggested a desire to finalize the guidance before the end of the Bush administra-
tion.
174 See Guidance for Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution
of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on
Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devic-
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1. Traditional Advertisements Touting Off-Label Uses
Before elaborating on these recent initiatives, one must ask about
the longstanding ban on the promotion of off-label uses. After all, the
guidance documents purport to carve out exceptions to this blanket
prohibition, which has caused some courts and commentators to mi-
sunderstand the nature of the industry's First Amendment objec-
tions. 17 5 In 2010, another challenge to the agency's restrictions on off-
label drug promotion was pending before a federal district court.176
With Western States dictating the nature of the analysis, the industry
might well have prevailed had it not decided to drop the suit.177
Two interests might support the FDA's prohibition. First, it would
have a substantial interest in protecting health care providers from
misleading information. Because, however, physicians are a sophisti-
es; Availability, 74 Fed. Reg. 1694 (Jan. 13, 2009). Thus, the agency managed to
issue the final guidance just before the transition to the Obama administration. See
Santosh V. Coutinho, Comment, License to Promote, or Just What the Doctor Or-
dered? The New FDA Guidance on Dissemination of Off-label Reprints by Pharma-
ceutical Companies, 28 TEMP. J. Sci. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 279, 301 (2009) ("Rep.
[Henry] Waxman, incoming chairman of the House of Representatives Energy and
Commerce Committee, has called the final guidance a 'long-coveted parting gift'
issued by 'political appointees at FDA' in the final hours of the Bush Administra-
tion." (citation omitted)); id. at 305 n.259 ("Waxman has called on the Obama admin-
istration to re-examine the Guidance.").
175 See, e.g., Jacob Rogers, Freedom of Speech and the FDA's Regulation of
Off-Label Drug Uses, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1429, 1441-43 (2008) (distinguishing
Western States in part by noting that the FDA allowed dissemination of enduring
materials discussing off-label uses under limited circumstances-without realizing
that the regulation had become inoperative-and in part by explaining that disclai-
mers would not serve as a less restrictive option-without realizing that the disclai-
mer alternative related only to an interest in protecting physicians from potentially
misleading information and had nothing to do with the separate interest in encourag-
ing the filing of supplemental NDAs for additional uses, which the government could
pursue through several other less restrictive alternatives).
76 See John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective
on Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'y L. & ETHICS 299, 339 (2010). Allergan recently agreed to drop its challenge as
part of a settlement of off-label promotion charges that cost it $600 million. See Sing-
er, supra note 156, at Al.
1n See A. Elizabeth Blackwell & James M. Beck, Drug Manufacturers' First
Amendment Right to Advertise and Promote Their Products for Off-Label Use: Avoid-
ing a Pyrrhic Victory, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 439, 439, 448-62 (2003). When raised in
the context of agency enforcement actions against off-label promotion, however,
lower courts have rejected First Amendment defenses. See United States v. Caronia,
576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 393-402 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); United States v. Caputo, 288 F.
Supp. 2d 912, 920-22 (N.D. Ill. 2003), aff'don other grounds, 517 F.3d 935, 939-40
(7th Cir. 2008) (suggesting possible merit to the avoided constitutional objections).
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cated audience,178 notwithstanding the fact that even they may en-
counter difficulties when it comes to finding and making sense of
therapeutic information,17 9 measures short of broadly prohibiting the
communication of such information (such as disclaimers) would make
the absolute ban on off-label promotion vulnerable under the final
prong of the Central Hudson test. Concerns about the potential to mis-
lead, which may be valid in the context of advertising to laypersons,
seem much less reasonable where the intended audience is a group of
highly educated and sophisticated professionals with specialized
knowledge in the fields being discussed.180 The prohibition also con-
flicts with the Supreme Court's repeated admonition that the First
178 See IMS Health Inc v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163, 181 (D.N.H. 2007)
("Health care providers are highly trained professionals who ... certainly are more
able than the general public to evaluate truthful pharmaceutical marketing messag-
es."), rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); Wash. Legal Found. v.
Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 70 (D.D.C. 1998) ("A physician's livelihood depends
upon the ability to make accurate, life-and-death decisions based upon the scientific
evidence before them. They are certainly capable of critically evaluating journal
articles or textbook reprints that are mailed to them, or the findings presented at CME
seminars."), order amended by 36 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999), order amended sub
nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 86 (D.D.C. 1999) ("[T]his
axiom [that government cannot suppress speech for fear of misuse] is particularly
powerful where the recipient of the information is a sophisticated listener trained
extensively in the use of such information-as are the doctors and other health care
providers in this case."), vacated in part and appeal dismissed, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); Noah, supra note 7, at 326-27, 346 (describing the FDA's and courts'
recognition of the special status of physicians); Paul H. Rubin, Are Pharmaceutical
Ads Deceptive?, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 7, 18-19 (1994).
179 See Lars Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffu-
sion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIz. L. REV. 373, 376, 381-84,
391-95, 402-06, 421-22, 432-33, 438-40, 465 (2002); see also Karen E. Lasser et
al., Adherence to Black Box Warnings for Prescription Medications in Outpatients,
166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 338, 342 (2006); Andrea Petersen, How Drug Alerts
Trickle Down to Your Doctor: Amid Flurry of Red Flags About Serious Side Effects,
Prescribing Turns Trickier, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2004, at D4 ("[R]esearch unders-
cores how difficult it is for doctors to stay on top of the mass of drug information, and
decide how or whether to act. The number of drugs has exploded in recent years, so
there are simply more side effects and potential drug-to-drug interactions to keep
track of."); Jonathan D. Rockoff, Doctors Buried by Drug Data, BALT. SUN, Apr. 7,
2006, at ID.
1so See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 636 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("Speech has the capacity to convey complex substance, yielding various
insights and interpretations depending upon the identity of the listener or the reader
and the context of its transmission."); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 775 (1993)
("The typical client of a CPA is far less susceptible to manipulation than the young
accident victim in Ohralik. Fane's prospective clients are sophisticated and expe-
rienced business executives who understand well the services that a CPA offers.").
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Amendment protects the communication of even incomplete informa-
tion. '
Second, the government would have a substantial interest in en-
couragmg manufacturers of approved new drugs to continue testing-
and seeking FDA approval for-additional uses. This interest seems
somewhat weaker than the one unsuccessfully advanced in Western
States, and it faces the same difficulties under the nexus prongs. Al-
though the opportunity to advertise freely might weaken incentives to
seek approval of supplemental NDAs,182 other incentives already play
a greater role in company decisions about undertaking additional re-
search. 183 Notwithstanding these various existing incentives, counter-
vailing pressures explain why drug manufacturers often do not bother
doing so.1 84 Liberalizing restrictions on off-label promotion would
not, in all likelihood, reduce the already relatively small number of
supplemental NDAs for new uses filed with the FDA.
Finally, even if the prohibition directly advanced a substantial go-
vernmental interest, it does so indirectly, making it vulnerable to the
objection that less restrictive alternatives would work just as well.s85
181 See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 562 (1980) ("Even when advertising communicates only an incomplete
version of the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that some accurate in-
formation is better than no information at all.").
182 Even when companies secure supplemental NDAs, however, they may
find their opportunities to promote those new indications constrained by agency con-
cems about inappropriate use. See, e.g., Jeff Swiatek, FDA OKs Lilly Growth Drug,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 26, 2003, at IC (reporting that, in approving expanded use
of Humatrope® to treat very short children, the FDA persuaded the manufacturer to
market this new use only to pediatric endocrinologists).
181 See William L. Christopher, Off-Label Drug Prescription: Filling a Regu-
latory Vacuum, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 254-61 (1993); Joshua Cohen et al., Off-
Label Use Reimbursement, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 400 (2009); Ralph F. Hall &
Robert J. Berlin, When You Have a Hammer, Everything Looks Like a Nail: Misap-
plication of the False Claims Act to Off-Label Promotion, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653
(2006); Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the
Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH.
61, 101-03, 106-17 (2008) (reviewing and critiquing litigation brought under the
False Claims Act).
184 See Noah, supra note 158, at 145; Mitchell Oates, Note, Facilitating In-
formed Medical Treatment Through Production and Disclosure of Research into Off-
Label Uses of Pharmaceuticals, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1272, 1280-86, 1307-08 (2005)
(explaining that drug manufacturers have only limited incentives to produce informa-
tion about the efficacy of off-label uses); David P. Hamilton, Do Statins Help Prevent
Cancer? Few Tests Slated, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2005, at Bl.
185 See Proposed Rule, Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription
Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, 37
Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,504 (Aug. 15, 1972) ("Where the unapproved use of an ap-
proved new drug becomes widespread or endangers the public health, . . . [s]everal
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For instance, Congress has offered extended protection from generic
competition to entice companies to conduct research into off-label
uses.186 Even more drastically (though less speech restrictive), Con-
gress simply could prohibit off-label use by health care profession-
als.187 Although any such initiative would trigger howls of protest
from physician groups, pharmaceutical manufacturers then would
have tremendous incentives to secure FDA approval for additional
uses (and then, under the first prong of Central Hudson, blanket pro-
hibitions on advertising that might encourage a black market in off-
label uses would pass constitutional muster).
Perhaps realizing that it would have difficulty defending a zero to-
lerance policy toward off-label promotion, the FDA has crafted sever-
al apparent exceptions to its blanket prohibition. It seems doubtful,
however, that these narrow carve-outs would save an otherwise prob-
lematic ban on advertising to physicians. Moreover, what the agency
alternative courses are available to [FDA] . . . ."). At one time, the FDA sought statu-
tory power to require that license holders undertake studies of widespread off-label
uses. See Noah, supra note 158, at 145-46. It does not, however, currently enjoy that
power. See Ass'n Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. FDA, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 222
(D.D.C. 2002); Tamar Lewin, U.S. Agency Wants the Pill Redefined, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 1996, at Al; U.S. Presses Drugmakers on Neglected Disorders, WASH. POST,
June 21, 2010, at A14. This lack of delegated authority would not, however, answer
the constitutional objection (otherwise, we would have to countenance an inverted
form of the greater-includes-the-lesser power argument, more readily sustaining re-
strictions on speech when Congress only grants an agency that power). See Noah,
supra note 171, at 143 ("[I]n considering the availability of less speech-restrictive
alternatives, courts may not accept the argument that an agency lacks the statutory
power to impose these options if some other governmental entity could do so.").
186 See Karena J. Cooper, Pediatric Marketing Exclusivity-As Altered by the
Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 519 (2002);
Lauren H. Breslow, Note, The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002: The
Rise of the Voluntary Incentive Structure and Congressional Refusal to Require Pe-
diatric Testing, 40 HARV. J. LEGIS. 133 (2003); Leslie Kushner, Note, Incentivizing
Postmarketing Pharmaceutical Product Safety Testing with Extension of Exclusivity
Periods, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 519 (2009); William E.
Ridgway, Note, Realizing Two-Tiered Innovation Policy Through Drug Regulation,
58 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1235-36 (2006) (explaining that this form of quasi-IP protec-
tion has become increasingly important).
187 See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the
Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 179, 189-90, 192-93 (2004); Sidney
A. Shapiro, Limiting Physician Freedom to Prescribe a Drug for Any Purpose: The
Need for FDA Regulation, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 801, 846-54, 869 70 (1978); cf 40
C.F.R. § 156.10(i)(2)(ii) (2010) (requiring the use of the following statement on all
pesticides: "It is a violation of Federal law to use this product in a manner inconsis-
tent with its labeling."). In fact, Congress recently confirmed the FDA's authority to
guard against certain risky off-label uses through the adoption of distribution restric-
tions. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
85, § 901(b), 121 Stat. 823, 930 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-l(f)(3)(A)).
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presented as "safe harbors" instead amounted to extensions of its ex-
isting prohibitions on direct promotion of off-label uses in order to
encompass certain forms of indirect advertising.188 Like stealth forms
of consumer product advertising (e.g., product placements in movies
and television shows),' 89 drug companies have found creative ways of
communicating with health care professionals.' 90
188 These purported "harbors" are neither new nor particularly safe-instead,
to borrow the inapt nautical metaphor, the agency has carved a deeper channel in an
existing harbor and used the dredge materials as fill to extend the shoreline. This may
have made navigation somewhat safer, but it leaves fewer places for anchorage, and
the newly created land provides only a shaky foundation for construction. Cf Keay
Davidson, Liquefaction Expected to Be Top Danger in Next Big One; Soil Turns to
Soup That Can't Support Buildings Built on It, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 21, 2006, at B7
("Liquefaction occurs when quake waves ripple through loose or compacted soils,
like the sandy fill that was poured into the bay over the last century to create new land
for property development.").
189 See Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEx.
L. REV. 83, 93-95 (2006); Matthew Savare, Comment, Where Madison Avenue Meets
Hollywood and Vine: The Business, Legal, and Creative Ramifications of Product
Placements, II UCLA ENT. L. REV. 331, 334 (2004); Stephanie Clifford, Before
Hiring Actors, Filmmakers Cast Products, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2010, at Al. One only
rarely finds pharmaceuticals as product placements in TV shows or movies. Cf Louis
Boyarsky, Comment, Stealth Celebrity Testimonials of Prescription Drugs: Placing
the Consumer in Harm's Way and How the FDA Has Dropped the Ball, 28 Loy. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 101 (2007-2008); Andrea Petersen, Episodic Illnesses: How Rare Ail-
ments Get on Prime Time, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1998, at Al ("[H]ealth foundations
and patient-advocacy groups wooing Hollywood television writers and producers ...
often use emotional appeals and personal connections in hopes of landing a 'product
placement' for their illness in prime time."). For instance, the 2004 film Sideways
included prominent references to Xanax® and Lexaproo, and the lead character Miles
(played by Paul Giamatti) put them to off-label use (taken in combination and with
lots of Pinot Noir!)-is that pure (artistic) or commercial speech (assuming that the
manufacturers paid the producer to include the reference), does it depend on referenc-
ing a brand-name product (assuming that those had not become so widely recognized
(e.g., Prozac® and Viagra®) as to have acquired a generic meaning), and should the
analysis be more or less protective because it targets a lay audience (does it matter
that impressionable moviegoers would still need to convince a physician to get a
prescription product-surely no one thinks that physicians would take their cues
about appropriate prescribing from Hollywood)? See generally Steven L. Snyder,
Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood Turning Films into Commercial
Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301; Jacob J. Strain, Note, Finding a Place for Embed-
ded Advertising Without Eroding the First Amendment: An Analysis of the Blurring
Line Between Verisimilar Programming and Commercial Speech, 24 BYU J. PUB. L.
167 (2009).
19 See, e.g., Michael A. Steinman et al., The Promotion of Gabapentin: An
Analysis of Internal Industry Documents, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 284, 290
(2006); Reed Abelson, Charities Tied to Doctors Get Drug Industry Gifts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2006, at Al; Gardiner Harris, Drug Makers Scrutinized over Grants,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. I1, 2006, at Cl; Scott Hensley & Barbara Martinez, To Sell Their
Drugs, Companies Increasingly Rely on Doctors, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2005, at Al;
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2. Industry-Sponsored Continuing Medical Education
The 1997 CME guidance provided that industry support of educa-
tional programs discussing off-label uses of the sponsoring company's
drug or device would escape FDA regulation only in the case of "truly
independent and nonpromotional programs," and it listed a dozen
"factors" that would go into making this determination: did the pro-
gram provider rather than the company control content (especially in
the selection of speakers), did the provider (and speakers) disclose
company sponsorship (and the off-label nature of uses under discus-
sion), did the program focus on a range of treatment options (rather
than a single product) for a disease or condition, is the program pro-
vider (and its employees) otherwise independent of the sponsoring
company, does the provider have an unblemished record in organizing
independent and scientifically rigorous programs, will the show go on
the road (and, if it does, did the sponsoring company commit to mul-
tiple presentations before viewing the first show), will the audience be
selected without the involvement of the company's marketing depart-
ment, will the audience get a meaningful opportunity to ask questions,
will the sponsor erect promotional exhibits in the vicinity of the meet-
ing room, and did the agency receive complaints from any participants
after the event? 9' The FDA hastened to add that this list of factors
was not exhaustive,192 and it emphasized that an objectionable answer
Melody Petersen, Court Papers Suggest Scale of Drug's Use, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,
2003, at Cl ("Warner-Lambert paid dozens of doctors tens of thousands of dollars
each to speak to other physicians about how Neurontin, an epilepsy drug, could be
prescribed for more than a dozen other medical uses that had not been approved by
the [FDA]."); Andrew Pollack, Talking up a Drug for This (and That), N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2003, § 3, at 1.
191 See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational
Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074, 64,094, 64,096-99 (Dec. 3, 1997); see also id. at
64,099 (adding that it would take into consideration any written agreement between
sponsoring company and program provider that addressed these various factors). The
preamble accompanying the final guidance included the agency's responses to the
numerous comments filed after publication of the draft guidance, which offer further
elaboration on the nature of this multifactor inquiry. See id. at 64,082-92.
192 Id. at 64,099. The FDA also explained that it would work with major ac-
crediting organizations involved in CME programs. See id. at 64,099-100; see also
New Rule Limits What Physicians Say in Classes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2004, at D4
(reporting that the Accreditation Council for CME adopted stricter standards for
commercial support). Industry sponsorship remains hard to avoid. See Robert M.
Tenery, Jr., Interactions Between Physicians and the Health Care Technology Indus-
try, 283 JAMA 391, 392 (2000) ("Unfortunately, while the need for CME for physi-
cians has increased with rapidly expanding technology, the funding from independent
sources has decreased proportionately."); Elizabeth Williamson & Christopher Lee,
Conflict Alleged in Drug Firms' Education Role, WASH. POST, June 27, 2007, at A3
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to any one of these questions would not necessarily trigger regulatory
action. 193
The prohibition on corporate sponsorship of CME programs that
fail to abide by the nonbinding guidance raises serious First Amend-
ment questions. Although the agency offered a defense of the consti-
tutionality of the guidance, 19 4 the arguments lacked persuasiveness
when first made in 1997,195 and subsequent Supreme Court decisions
further weaken the FDA's position. As a threshold matter, the agency
suggested that its policy escaped commercial speech scrutiny alto-
gether, relying on lower court decisions exempting the rules of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from First Amendment
protections.19 6 Putting aside questions about the propriety of this
anomalous treatment of securities regulations,197 the courts uniformly
have treated FDA restrictions on the marketing of therapeutic prod-
ucts as subject to the First Amendment. The more interesting question
in this context asks whether the agency restrictions limit nothing more
("Overall, commercial sponsors pick up about half of the $2.25 billion annual cost of
the courses doctors must attend to keep their licenses.").
193 See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational
Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,096 ("These factors will be considered as part of an
overall evaluation of an activity; no individual factor is likely by itself to stimulate an
action based on lack of independence.").
194 See id. at 64,076-82.
195 See Edmund Polubinski III, Note, Closing the Channels of Communica-
tion: A First Amendment Analysis of the FDA's Policy on Manufacturer Promotion of
"Off-Label" Use, 83 VA. L. REv. 991, 1019-34 (1997) (evaluating the off-label drug
promotion guidance documents in the wake of 44 Liquormart). In general approach,
this part of the agency's preamble closely tracked the First Amendment arguments
that the FDA had offered a few years earlier in the preamble accompanying its regula-
tions governing health claims for foods. See Food Labeling; General Requirements
for Health Claims for Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2478, 2524-28 (Jan. 6, 1993); see also
David G. Adams, FDA Regulation of Communications on Pharmaceutical Products,
24 SETON HALL L. REv. 1399, 1414-15 (1994) ("Although the agency has yet to
address these questions in any formal manner with regard to pharmaceutical products,
the agency has addressed similar issues in the context of food labeling."). In my first
article addressing the broader subject, Liberating Commercial Speech: Product Labe-
ling Controls and the First Amendment, 47 FLA. L. REv. 63 (1995), 1 offered an ex-
tended critique of the agency's constitutional defense of its health claims rule, see id.
at 89-104.
196 See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational
Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,076-78.
19 See Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment's Application to
Securities Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REv. 789 (2007); Highberger, supra note 117, at
2149-62.
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than commercial speech or whether they impinge upon the dissemina-
tion of fully protected scientific speech.' 9
As a further illustration of the weaknesses in the FDA's constitu-
tional defense of the CME guidance, consider its cavalier treatment of
the often fatal final step in the Central Hudson test: "The Supreme
Court has expressed a willingness to defer the fourth-prong determi-
nation to the regulating body."l 99 Although a fair reading of decisions
from the late 1980s and early 1990s, such deference has entirely dis-
appeared. 20 0 The FDA then explained that it had narrowly tailored its
guidance because it applied only to industry-supported programs that
involve discussions of company products (not surprising insofar as it
lacked jurisdiction to reach beyond that point) and in no way limits
what independent scientists and organizations may say, it allowed
some industry-sponsored programs that involve discussion of compa-
ny products (and it used disclosure requirements), and it took serious-
ly comments submitted in response to its somewhat less flexible draft
guidance by including revisions in the final version. 20 1 The agency
failed, however, to explain-as the current Court surely would in-
sist-why disclosure requirements alone would not achieve its goal of
guarding against the dissemination of potentially misleading informa-
tion.202 The FDA also made no effort to document the extent to which
198 See Peggy Chen, Education or Promotion?: Industry-Sponsored Continu-
ing Medical Education (CME) as a Center for the Core/Commercial Speech Debate,
58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 473, 493-96, 498-509 (2003). For a parallel in the consumer
marketplace, see Ellen P. Goodman, Peer Promotions and False Advertising Law, 58
S.C. L. REv. 683, 703-06 (2007); id. at 686 ("Where brand owners sponsor peer pro-
motions but conceal their involvement, the resulting communication mixes the com-
mercial speech of the sponsor with the noncommercial speech of the peer.").
' Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activi-
ties, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,081.
200 See Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1059 ("The Central Hudson test no longer
gives deference to government judgments or upholds restraints on commercial speech
as long as they are reasonable and proportionate to the interests served, as it did as
recently as [1994].").
201 See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational
Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,081-82.
202 Physicians apparently recognize the nature of these programs. See Scott
Hensley, Remedial Lessons: When Doctors Go to Class, Industry Often Foots the Bill,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2002, at Al ("Many physicians view industry-sponsored
courses-even those that follow all the rules-as verging on infomercials."); Shankar
Vedantam, Industry Role in Medical Meeting Decried: Symposiums Sponsored by
Pharmaceutical Companies Trouble Some Psychiatrists, WASH. POST, May 26, 2002,
at AIO. Moreover, the policing of industry-sponsored educational and scientific
events seems ideally suited for case-by-case adjudication. Compare Cali v. Danek
Med., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 941, 949-50 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (rejecting fraud claims
against medical societies for sponsoring seminars at which allegedly unsafe uses of
pedicle screws in spinal fusion were discussed), with Coleman v. Danek Med., Inc.,
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the prohibition on nonindependent industry-supported CME programs
would advance its broader goal of ensuring that companies seek FDA
approval of off-label uses.
3. Company Distribution of Medical Article Reprints
The 2009 guidance on "enduring" materials provides that manu-
facturers may disseminate reprints of scientific or medical journal
articles or reference books discussing off-label uses of their drugs or
devices only under limited circumstances. 20 3 Among other things, the
publisher should engage in peer review and require that authors dis-
close conflicts of interest, the manufacturer should not sponsor or
significantly influence publication of the volume or article, the publi-
cation should discuss only adequate and well-controlled clinical trials,
and the information must not be false or misleading or "pose a signifi-
cant risk to the public health, if relied upon."204 The agency did not
elaborate on what it meant by this last (catch all) prohibition, though it
seems to anticipate that physicians who receive truthful, nonmislead-
ing information about well-controlled clinical trials published in peer-
reviewed journals nonetheless might misinterpret the reprint in ways
that the agency fears could threaten patient welfare.
Even if enduring materials satisfy these demanding criteria, the
guidance also limits the manner of their distribution by the manufac-
turer: an article should not be abridged or highlighted (or have any
promotional materials attached to it), should be accompanied by the
product's approved labeling as well as a comprehensive bibliography
of other publications discussing the off-label use (and, if other articles
have reached contrary conclusions, a reprint of one of those, plus dis-
closures of any significant safety concerns with the off-label use
43 F. Supp. 2d 629 (S.D. Miss. 1998) (holding that FDAMA's protections of the
practice of medicine would not preclude such a claim). It is generally inappropriate to
restrict an entire category of speech in order to guard against a possible subset of false
or misleading speech. For an earlier piece criticizing the overbreadth of the agency's
initial policy, see Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, FDA Efforts to Control the Flow
of Information at Pharmaceutical Industry-Sponsored Medical Education Programs:
A Regulatory Overdose, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1325 (1994).
203 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, GOOD REPRINT
PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR
SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED
DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009), available at
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2008-D-0053-gdl.pdf.
204 See id. at 4-5. The agency offered the following examples of publications
that would not qualify: articles in special supplements of a journal sponsored by the
manufacturer, letters to the editor, abstracts, and results from early clinical trials in
healthy subjects. See id.
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known by the manufacturer), it should not be discussed by sales repre-
sentatives or distributed during promotional events, and it "should be
accompanied by a prominently displayed and permanently affixed
statement disclosing" that the FDA has not approved the use and that
the manufacturer (and, if applicable, the author) has a financial inter-
est in the product discussed.205 In short, manufacturers may mail to
physicians generally unadorned reprints of original research articles
appearing in genuinely peer-reviewed journals discussing clinical
trials meeting the FDA's rigorous standards but only if accompanied
by any relevant negative information. Although each of these criteria
may make good sense as a policy matter, in combination they leave
only a narrow (and tenuous) opening for company dissemination of
information related to off-label uses. As a result, manufacturers now
know that surreptitious efforts to promote such uses generally fall out
of bounds and face the threat of sanctions.
In effect, the FDA has announced that it will treat as unlawful the
dissemination of enduring materials beyond the limited contours of its
nonbinding guidance. Like the earlier CME guidance (and the more
general prohibition on any direct promotion of off-label uses), this
policy raises serious First Amendment questions. Unlike the CME
guidance, and notwithstanding the Supreme Court's intervening deci-
sions, the FDA offered no constitutional defense when it published its
latest guidance on enduring materials.206 The guidance document did
not, however, differ dramatically from the regulations governing en-
during materials that had become inoperative in 2006, and the agency
had offered repeated though inconsistent (and ultimately inconclusive)
defenses of their constitutionality.20 7
205 See id. at 5-6; see also Michelle M. Mello et al., Shifting Terrain in the
Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557,
1559-61 (2009).
206 See Guidance for Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution
of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on
Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devic-
es; Availability, 74 Fed. Reg. 1694 (Jan. 13, 2009).
207 See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text. As the Supreme Court
had done in Western States, see supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text, the dis-
trict court that invalidated the earlier regulations governing the distribution of endur-
ing materials that discuss off-label uses had alluded to an unconstitutional conditions
problem without comprehending its (in)significance, see Wash. Legal Found. v. Hen-
ney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87 (D.D.C. 1999) ("The supplemental [NDA] application
requirement of [FDAMA § 401] amounts to a kind of constitutional blackmail-
comply with the statute or sacrifice your First Amendment rights. It should go without
saying that this tactic cannot survive judicial scrutiny."), vacated in part and appeal
dismissed, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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In the end, and without becoming distracted by the fact that the
FDA's guidance purports to allow speech that otherwise might violate
background prohibitions, the question is whether the extension of the
background prohibition to most instances of this form of indirect
promotion directly (and with relative precision) advances a substantial
government interest. Obviously, by allowing a little bit of speech, the
guidance is better tailored than a flat prohibition, and disclosure re-
quirements to counteract the potentially misleading nature of the
speech should pass muster, but the FDA would have some difficulty
proving the utility of the additional restrictions in either guarding
against the potential to mislead the highly educated recipients of the
information or encouraging companies to file supplemental NDAs.
More generally, some have argued that the dissemination of enduring
materials deserves even greater constitutional protection as noncom-
mercial speech.208
Imagine that the FDA decided to treat as promotional labeling or
advertising any articles published in peer-reviewed journals and au-
thored by academic scientists when they endorse an off-label use of a
product manufactured by the company that had sponsored the research
even if it did nothing further to disseminate the article. 2 09 Such a poli-
cy would not differ dramatically from the previously discussed CME
guidance, 2 10 and it shares similarities with published studies ghost-
208 See, e.g., Glenn C. Smith, Avoiding Awkward Alchemy in the Off-Label
Drug Context and Beyond: Fully-Protected Independent Research Should Not
Transmogrify into Mere Commercial Speech Just Because Product Manufacturers
Distribute It, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 1019-55 (1999). After all, the mailed
materials hardly resemble traditional advertising. See Daniel J. Gilman, Protecting
Protected Speech: First Amendment Taxonomy and the Food and Drug Administra-
tion's Regulation of "Enduring Materials," 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 463, 466-70
(2003); cf Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (conclud-
ing that manufacturer-produced pamphlets about contraceptives mailed to laypersons
qualified as commercial speech based on satisfying three criteria related to format,
content (i.e., mentioning a specific product), and economic motivation).
209 See J. Howard Beales, III, Economic Analysis and the Regulation of
Pharmaceutical Advertising, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 1370, 1395 n.1 11 (1994) ("[I1f
financial support from a pharmaceutical manufacturer converts speeches at scientific
meetings into promotional pieces, it would appear to suffice to make journal articles
by those same people promotional pieces as well."); David A. Kessler & Wayne L.
Pines, The Federal Regulation of Prescription Drug Advertising and Promotion, 264
JAMA 2409, 2409-10 (1990) (explaining that the FDA "has defined its authority in
this area to cover virtually any material issued by or sponsored by a drug manufactur-
er," but adding that "[a] person with no ties to a drug manufacturer can say anything
he or she wants about a drug"); cf FDA, Compliance Policy Guide No. 7132b.17
(Aug. 15, 1989) (declining to treat independently-authored articles as drug labeling or
advertising).
21o In fact, the typical link between company sponsor and CME speaker seems
relatively weak, see Chen, supra note 198, at 499-500, 506-08, compared to the often
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authored by company personnel that the FDA presumably could deem
to serve as advertising. 211 Would it violate the First Amendment for
the agency to take enforcement action against drugs or devices mis-
leadingly described in articles authored by researchers who received
company funding? The FDA has done so in cases where material au-
thored by third parties gets linked to a seller's product, 2 12 but the con-
nection in this hypothetical seems to be even more attenuated.
Corporate sponsorship of drug research has an unmistakable im-
pact on the conclusions reached by nominally independent scien-
tists, 2 13 and the effect becomes even clearer when companies sponsor
close link between company sponsor and author, see Catherine D. DeAngelis, Edi-
torial, The Influence of Money on Medical Science, 296 JAMA 996 (2006); Noah,
supra note 179, at 411-12; Robert Steinbrook, Gag Clauses in Clinical-Trial Agree-
ments, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2160 (2005).
211 See Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1542 (2000); Annette Flana-
gin et al., Prevalence of Articles with Honorary Authors and Ghost Authors in Peer-
Reviewed Medical Journals, 280 JAMA 222 (1998); Natasha Singer, Report Urges
More Curbs on Medical Ghostwriting, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2010, at B4.
212 See, e.g., United States v. Diapulse Mfg. Corp., 389 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.
1968) (holding that reprints of medical articles distributed with a device qualified as
labeling); United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 547 (D.N.J. 2004),
aff'd, 427 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Vital Health Prods. Ltd., 786 F.
Supp. 761 (E.D. Wis. 1992), aff'd mem. sub nom. United States v. LeBeau, 985 F.2d
563 (7th Cir.1993); cf 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(2) (2010) (defining "labeling" broadly but
requiring that it contain information supplied by the manufacturer or other seller of
the drug); United States v. Articles of Drug for Veterinary Use, 50 F.3d 497 (8th Cir.
1995) (rebuffing FDA claim that the mere placement at retail of a product near a book
turns the latter into product labeling); LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY 16 (2d ed. 2007) ("Could the FDA assert jurisdiction over a textbook
on antibiotic therapies because it too is intended for use in the treatment of patients
(and, if the information is incorrect, it would defeat the purpose of demanding pre-
clearance of antibiotics)?"). Before commercial speech enjoyed constitutional status,
lower courts had rejected constitutional objections to FDA enforcement actions seiz-
ing books that were used as product labeling. See United States v. Articles of Drug,
32 F.R.D. 32 (S.D. Ill. 1963); United States v. 8 Cartons of Molasses, 103 F. Supp.
626, 627 (W.D.N.Y. 1951).
213 See Noah, supra note 179, at 407 ("Numerous surveys have found that
research on new drugs is more likely to turn out favorably when sponsored by the
manufacturer."); see also id. at 406-12, 415, 422-24 (describing the pervasive nature
of conflicts of interest in the production and dissemination of biomedical research);
id. at 408-09 (explaining the shortcomings in requirements for the disclosure of po-
tential conflicts of interest); Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial
Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454,
463 (2003); Paul M Ridker & Jose Torres, Reported Outcomes in Major Cardiovas-
cular Clinical Trials Funded by For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Organizations: 2000-
2005, 295 JAMA 2270 (2006); Rosie Taylor & Jim Giles, Cash Interests Taint Drug
Advice, 437 NATURE 1070 (2005) (finding conflicts of interest among authors of
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symposium issues of medical journals.214 Nonetheless, sponsored re-
search articles surely deserve the greater constitutional protection af-
forded scientific rather than merely commercial speech,215 even if
company distribution of reprints would alter the analysis, 216 and
putting aside suggestions that the First Amendment offers no protec-
tion of corporate sponsorship of speech by others.2 17
clinical practice guidelines); Shirley S. Wang, Simply Disclosing Funds Behind Stu-
dies May Not Erase Bias, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2006, at A 1.
214 See Lars Noah, Sanctifying Scientific Peer Review: Publication as a Proxy
for Regulatory Decisionmaking, 59 U. PIr. L. REV. 677, 708 (1998); see also Daniel
Carlat, Op-Ed., Generic Smear Campaign, N.Y. TIMEs, May 9, 2006, at A27 (explain-
ing that the makers of new sleep aids such as Ambien® and Lunesta® funded publica-
tion of review articles in medical journals that criticized the widespread off-label use
of the older and far cheaper drug trazodone to treat insomnia).
215 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 62 (D.D.C.
1998), order amended by 36 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999), order amended sub nom.
Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999), vacated in part and
appeal dismissed, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446-47 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining the "settled" view
"that the First Amendment protects scientific expression and debate just as it protects
political and artistic expression" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gorran v. Atkins
Nutritionals, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 315, 326-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). See generally Chris-
topher P. Guzelian, Scientific Speech, 93 IOwA L. REV. 881 (2008).
216 See supra note 208 and accompanying text. A parallel question occasional-
ly has arisen in Lanham Act litigation. See Oxycal Lab., Inc. v. Jeffers, 909 F. Supp.
719, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1995); Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. Phys-
ics, 859 F. Supp. 1521, 1536-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the Act applied to
secondary uses of scientific articles but not to their publication).
217 See Randall P. Bezanson, Speaking Through Others' Voices: Authorship,
Originality, and Free Speech, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 983, 1047 n.199 (2003) ("[I1f
the contributor is nothing more than a poet's patron, can the contributor claim First
Amendment protection for the act of generosity; or must the contributor do more,
transforming the poet's words into the contributor's own ideas for patronage to cross
the line into expression?"); id. at 1048-49, 1110 (concluding that transformation must
occur); id. at 985 n.8 ("Speech selection judgments involve the appropriation or selec-
tion of speech originally created elsewhere (by another) and the secondary deploy-
ment of that material in another context by a person or entity different than the origi-
nal creator."); cf Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)
(invalidating restrictions on corporate communications related to elections). In other
words, according to this view, in threatening to penalize the manufacturer (and its
products) when sponsoring research that results in the publication of articles promot-
ing off-label uses, the FDA would not visit any sort of sanction on the authors them-
selves or chill their (fully protected) expressive activity except in the sense that indus-
try funding of such work might well dry up. Only if the agency took the position that
it could enjoin publication-or directly penalize the authors-of such purportedly
false or misleading promotional drug labeling would a serious First Amendment
question arise. Cf Alex Berenson, Indictment of Doctor Tests Drug Marketing Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2006, at Al (reporting the arrest of a psychiatrist accused of
conspiring with the manufacturer of Xyremo (gamma hydroxybutyrate) to publicize
off-label uses of this narcolepsy drug at CME events). If accurate, then the existing
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B. Saving Misguided Patients (and Their Doctors) from
Themselves?
In 2007, Congress considered bills that would have given the
FDA the power to impose a moratorium on consumer advertising of
certain new prescription drugs during their first two or three years on
the market, when most unexpected adverse reactions come to light.218
Although those proposals died on the Hill,219 interest in the idea has
not gone away.220 In the wake of Western States, however, the consti-
CME policy would pose a commercial free speech problem only to the extent that
speakers served as mouthpieces for their corporate sponsors, which is precisely what
the FDA seeks to prevent.
218 See Bruce Japsen, Ads for New Drugs Spark Fight; Congress Ponders
Possible Moratorium, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 2007, at Cl; see also INST. OF MED., THE
FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC
171 (Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2007) (recommending a moratorium); Bruce Japsen,
AMA Urges a No-Ad Period for New Drugs, CHI. TRIB., June 15, 2006, at Cl. When
DTCA began in the early 1980s, the FDA called for a voluntary moratorium so that it
could study the issue. See Noah, supra note 18, at 147.
219 See Anna Wilde Mathews & Stephanie Kang, Media Industry Helped
Drug Firms Fight Ad Restraints, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2007, at Bl. Instead, Con-
gress authorized the FDA to demand submission of advertisements 45 days prior to
broadcast so that it could review them. See Food and Drug Administration Amend-
ments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 901(d), 121 Stat. 823, 939 (to be codified
at 21 U.S.C. § 353b); see also 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(j) (2010) (establishing a similar
system for all advertisements of certain drugs under "extraordinary circumstances");
id § 314.550 (same for drugs approved under accelerated procedures). Commercial
speech doctrine evidently allows for prior restraints of this sort. See Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571 n.13 (1980); Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 & n.24
(1976); Post, supra note 13, at 32-33. But see Nutritional Health Alliance v. Shalala,
144 F.3d 220, 227 (2d Cir. 1998) (questioning this assumption); cf Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) ("[U]njustified or unduly burden-
some disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling pro-
tected commercial speech."); Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
220 See Ceci Connolly, With More Oversight on the Horizon, Drugmakers
Work to Polish Image, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2009, at Al ("Rep. Henry A. Waxman
(D-Calif.), the incoming chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee, supports
legislation giving the FDA power to selectively ban direct-to-consumer advertising in
the initial years a medication is on the market."); Natasha Singer, Citing Risks, Law-
makers Seek to Curb Drug Commercials, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2009, at B 1; see also
Francis B. Palumbo & C. Daniel Mullins, The Development of Direct-to-Consumer
Prescription Drug Advertising Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 423, 434-36 (2002)
(discussing earlier proposals). Wholly apart from the constitutional questions, DTCA
continues to generate heated policy debate. See Julie M. Donohue et al., A Decade of
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 673,
674 (2007); Matthew F. Hollon, Editorial, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: A Ha-
phazard Approach to Health Promotion, 293 JAMA 2030 (2005); Richard L. Kravitz,
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: Implications for the Patient-
Physician Relationship, 284 JAMA 2244 (2000); Nat Ives, FDA Ponders Pros and
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tutionality of such a law (or agency regulation 2 2 1) seems extremely
doubtful.222 As mentioned previously, the dissenting members in that
case followed a line of reasoning that might have sustained a flat pro-
hibition on DTCA,22 3 though even for them it would present a closer
case: fears about the overuse of compounded drugs that had not un-
dergone any premarket testing seem weaker for FDA-approved drugs
that have survived such (though inevitably incomplete 22 4) scrutiny,
while the benefits of the squelched information might strike these
Justices as somewhat weightier. In any event, their views failed to
prevail (though partly because those in the majority did not believe
that the government had invoked the demand-dampening rationale),
and subsequent changes in the membership of the Court hardly por-
Cons of the Ways Prescription Drugs Are Promoted to Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
29, 2003, at ClI; see also U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-54,
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA's OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-
CONSUMER ADVERTISING (2006).
221 See Neil, supra note 151, at B 1 ("The new FDA guidelines suggest that if
drug advertising can't be banned outright, it might be regulated to death."); see also
Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertisements; Presentation of the Major
Statement in Television and Radio Advertisements in a Clear, Conspicuous, and
Neutral Manner, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,376 (proposed Mar. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 202); Draft Guidance for Industry on Presenting Risk Information in Pre-
scription Drug and Medical Device Promotion; Availability, 74 Fed. Reg. 25,245
(May 27, 2009).
222 See Mark I. Schwartz, To Ban or Not to Ban-That Is the Question: The
Constitutionality of a Moratorium on Consumer Drug Advertising, 63 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 1, 8-27, 32-33 (2008); Miriam Shuchman, Drug Risks and Free Speech-Can
Congress Ban Consumer Drug Ads?, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2236, 2238 (2007) (re-
porting that "both liberal and conservative experts on the First Amendment view the
proposed ban as likely to fail" in the courts); see also David C. Vladeck, The Difficult
Case of Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising, 41 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 259, 279-91
(2007) (canvassing the competing arguments, and concluding hopefully that some
DTCA restrictions would survive). But see Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Safety and
Commercial Speech: Television Advertisements and Reprints on Off-Label Uses, 47
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 845, 868-76, 894-95 (2010) (defending the constitutionality of a
targeted moratorium, though primarily on the strength of Justice Breyer's dissenting
opinion in Western States).
223 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 379-85 (2002)
(Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 788-89 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (warning that con-
stitutional protection for price advertising by pharmacists would prevent the govern-
ment from banning DTCA).
224 See Noah, supra note 161, at 394-96; see also Barry Meier, Medicine
Fueled by Marketing Intensified Trouble for Pain Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, §
1, at I (reporting that aggressive DTCA fueled tremendous initial demand for COX-2
inhibitors, which later turned out to carry serious cardiac risks and only limited bene-
fits).
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tend any dramatic pro-government shift in the approach to commer-
225
cial speech cases.
Although the DTCA prohibition remains hypothetical, the FDA
did at one point informally prohibit consumer advertisements of ap-
proved pharmaceutical products classified as Schedule II drugs under
226the Controlled Substances Act.26 The agency stopped following this
policy in 2001,227 but it poses a focused variant of the more sweeping
recent proposals to limit DTCA for purposes of dampening excess
consumer demand.228 Although the use of heavily advertised Schedule
II drugs-such as psychoactive medications to treat attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)-has increased dramatically in the
last decade,229 this would hardly demonstrate the wisdom (much less
225 See Schwartz, supra note 222, at 27-31; id. at 31-32 ("[I]n the coming
years it would be surprising if the Supreme Court were not more receptive to the idea
of constitutional protection for commercial speech, both because of the inconsistent
records of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor in that regard, and because
the limited information we have about Justice Alito, in particular, suggests . . . a broad
view of the constitutional scope of that right."). Two of the Justices in the Western
States majority (O'Connor and Souter) and two in the dissent (Rehnquist and Stevens)
have since retired, while their replacements (Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and little Ms.
Kagan) seem somewhat more inclined toward an expansive view of the First
Amendment. See Robert Barnes, Alito Stands Alone on Supreme Court's First
Amendment Cases, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2011, at A2.
226 See Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation ofPain Management
Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHics 55, 64 (2003). The FDA also occasionally has
persuaded companies "voluntarily" to delay advertising as a condition of licensure.
See Scott Gottlieb, Drug Safety Proposals and the Intrusion of Federal Regulation
into Patient Freedom and Medical Practice, 26 HEALTH AFF. 664, 671 (2007); see
also Noah, supra note 164, at 881-82, 892-93 (documenting other instances of "arm-
twisting" by the agency designed to restrict drug advertising); id. at 883 (asking
"could the FDA condition product approvals on agreements not to engage in broad-
cast advertising"?).
227 See Matthew N. Strawn, Comment, Recent Developments in Direct Con-
sumer Advertising ofAttention Disorder Stimulants and Creating Limits to Withstand
Constitutional Scrutiny, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & Pot'Y 495, 500-03 (2003)
(explaining that until 2001 a "gentlemen's agreement" between the federal govern-
ment and the pharmaceutical industry, based on a provision in an international con-
vention that the U.S. had signed, prohibited direct-to-consumer advertising of these
controlled substances).
228 See id at 512-20 (arguing that the government could restrict such adver-
tising without running afoul of the First Amendment, though failing to take into ac-
count the Supreme Court's decision in Western States).
229 See Shankar Vedantam, Debate over Drugs for ADHD Reignites, WASH.
POST, Mar. 27, 2009, at Al (reporting that prescriptions for ADHD drugs have
reached almost 40 million annually); Shankar Vedantam, Warning Urged for ADHD
Drugs: Panel Cites Risks, Fears of Overuse, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2006, at Al
("About 10 percent of 10-year-old American boys are taking such medications, and
there have been recent sharp increases in the number of adults taking them.").
HEALTH MA TRIX
23
constitutionality) of the older restriction.230 Perhaps DTCA usefully
has drawn attention to a previously unrecognized and undertreated
problem, though serious doubts exist on that score. 23 1 Perhaps it has
allowed newer (arguably safer or more effective) treatments to dis-
place the long used drug Ritalino (methylphenidate hydrochloride)
more rapidly than otherwise would have happened.232
A more formal such example that remains in effect prohibits drug
manufacturers from publishing "reminder ads" in print media if the
FDA mandates a so-called "black box" warning for a product. 233 Al-
though it also appears to spring from a demand-dampening purpose,
this restriction seems far less intrusive insofar as manufacturers evi-
dently would remain free to broadcast reminder ads, as well as use
print ads so long as they included full prescribing information. Indeed,
the agency could argue that the reminder ad format, which fails to
include full risk information, is potentially misleading for especially
dangerous products that necessitate a black box warning, or it could
recast the reminder ad format as itself a limited exception from the
usual disclosure requirements applicable to print ads and explain that
denial of the exception for this small subset of prescription drugs
230 After all, the controversy predated liberalization of the advertising policy.
In the mid-I 990s, the United States manufactured and used the bulk of the world's
Ritalin supply, and prescribing rates for very young children increased substantially.
See Lawrence H. Diller, The Run on Ritalin: Attention Deficit Disorder and Stimulant
Treatment in the 1990s, 26 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 12 (1996); Gina Kolata, Boom in
Ritalin Sales Raises Ethical Issues, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1996, at C8; see also Vess v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) (reviewing litigation against the
manufacturer of Ritalin). But see Larry S. Goldman et at., Diagnosis and Treatment of
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in Children and Adolescents, 279 JAMA
1100 (1998) (finding little evidence of substantial rates of ADHD misdiagnosis or
overprescribing of Ritalin for the disorder).
231 See Todd E. Elder, The Importance of Relative Standards in ADHD Diag-
noses: Evidence Based on Exact Birth Dates, 29 J. HEALTH ECON. 641 (2010); Connie
Lenz, Prescribing a Legislative Response: Educators, Physicians, and Psychotropic
Medication for Children, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 72 (2005). A growing
number of students cramming for tests take drugs intended to treat ADHD, which
some have dubbed "academic steroids." See Shankar Vedantam, Millions Have Mi-
sused ADHD Stimulant Drugs, Study Says, WASH. PosT, Feb. 25, 2006, at A9.
232 See Matt McMillen, A New Choice for Treating ADHD, WASH. POST, Feb.
4, 2003, at Fl (describing the discovery and potential advantages of the non-stimulant
drug Strattera®); Dennis O'Brien, New Guide Aims to Help Parents Ensure Their
Children Get Best Available ADHD Treatments, BALT. SUN, Oct. 3, 2007, at 4A; cf
Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Strengthens Warnings on Stimulants' Risks, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 2006, at A14.
233 See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(2)(i) (2010); cf Raymond G. Mullady Jr., Every-
thing You Needed and Wanted to Know About Black Boxed Warnings, 68 DEF.
CouNs. J. 50, 55 (2001) ("There currently is no analogous prohibition or restriction on
advertising black box drugs through the media of radio or television.").
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amounts to a full disclosure requirement that normally finds favor as a
regulatory technique under Central Hudson. Conversely, however,
because the restriction applies equally to printed reminder ads directed
to both patients and physicians, it may sweep too broadly.
States and localities occasionally have suggested taking similar
initiatives. For example, San Francisco once considered prohibiting
any print advertisements in bus shelters of drugs for the treatment of
AIDS because of concerns that they may convey an overly optimistic
message about the drugs' safety and effectiveness, thereby potentially
undermining efforts to encourage safer sex.234 Although the public
health rationale behind such an ordinance makes perfect sense, it
seems unlikely that it would pass muster under the First Amendment.
Only if the ads communicated an unduly optimistic message about the
effectiveness of AIDS drugs could the government seriously argue
that it had acted to guard against the threat posed by the dissemination
of misleading information. 23 5 Otherwise, the FDA could prohibit
DTCA for erectile dysfunction drugs simply because they may pro-
mote promiscuity and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases
among aging Baby Boomers.23 6
C. Squelching Efforts to Influence Public Health Discourse?
Imagine, for a moment, putting the proverbial shoe on the other
foot: messages directed to laypersons that highlighted supposed dan-
gers associated with the use of therapeutic products. As it happens,
plaintiffs' lawyers have begun doing precisely that in the course of
234 See John Ritter, Ads Linked to Rise in Rate ofHIV Infections: City Consid-
ers Ban on Drug Billboards, USA TODAY, Apr. 6, 2001, at 4A. Florida recently
banned all advertising of controlled substances by pain clinics as part of a new law
already challenged on constitutional grounds. See Bob LaMendola, Crackdown
Leaves Pain Clinics Hurting, SUN SENT. (FT. LAUD.), Oct. 2, 2010, at ID.
235 See Sabin Russell, Deceptive AIDS Ads Must Stop, FDA Says, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 28, 2001, at Al (reporting that the agency sent warning letters to com-
panies); Bernadette Tansey, FDA Slaps Drugmakers for Misleading Claims, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 9, 2003, at BI ("The FDA warned Gilead for the second time in just
over a year that its sales representatives were downplaying the risks and exaggerating
the benefits of its HIV drug, Viread."); see also Eric Lichtblau, Settlement in Market-
ing of a Drug for AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005, at Cl (discussing Serostime for
AIDS wasting).
2 See Anupam B. Jena et al., Sexually Transmitted Diseases Among Users of
Erectile Dysfunction Drugs: Analysis of Claims Data, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1,
1, 5-6 (2010) (finding that such concerns are overstated); cf Brumley v. Pfizer, Inc.,
149 F. Supp. 2d 305, 313-14 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (rejecting a "creative" theory that such
a drug proximately caused a patient's death: "Plaintiffs contend that Viagra allowed
Mr. Brumley to engage in vigorous sexual intercourse, and that the exertion from this
activity caused Mr. Brumley to suffer a fatal heart attack.").
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searching for clients purportedly injured by pharmaceuticals and med-
ical devices.237 For the most part, however, the products subject to
these sorts of advertisements do not fill any critical therapeutic need
or serve any public health function. Imagine, therefore, lawyer ads
directed to parents of children who happened to develop autism short-
ly after receiving a vaccination against measles, mumps, and rubella
(MMR). Although the hypothesized link, which in fact originated with
a physician who had received financial support from plaintiffs' law-
yers,23 8 has been completely discredited,239 vocal advocacy groups
continue to insist that the MMR vaccine and the preservative thime-
*240
rosal may cause autism.
Obviously, the government could not prevent the advocacy groups
from disseminating their message--core First Amendment principles
would prohibit efforts to stifle such debate no matter how wrong-
headed and potentially detrimental to the public health.241 If, however,
237 See Lars Noah, Platitudes About "Product Stewardship" in Torts: Contin-
uing Drug Research and Education, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 359, 377
n.75 (2009); see also id. at 377 ("[P]laintiffs' lawyers do their share of tacky (and
potentially hazardous) direct advertising to users of such products, though they would
not have to fear tort claims brought by patients who discontinued a prescribed (and
still net beneficial) course of treatment . . . in response to exaggerated risk informa-
tion appearing in ads trolling for clients." (footnote omitted)). For example, one re-
cent ad campaign run by an Orlando plaintiffs' lawyer alarmingly noted that the di-
abetes drug Avandia® (rosiglitazone maleate) may cause heart attack and stroke,
briefly flashing the following disclaimer in small print on the screen: "Never stop
taking any medication before asking your doctor." See http://www.avandia-lawyer.tv/
(last visited Aug. 11, 2010).
238 See Liz Szabo, '98 Study Linking Vaccines to Autism "An Elaborate
Fraud," USA TODAY, Jan. 6, 2011, at 9A (noting that Dr. Wakefield "was paid more
than $675,000 by a lawyer hoping to sue vaccine makers").
239 See Hazlehurst v. HHS, 604 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010); David Brown,
Experts Find No Vaccine-Autism Link, WASH. POST, May 19, 2004, at A2; John F.
Burns, British Council Bars Doctor Who Linked Vaccine with Autism, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 2010, at A4; Kate Kelland, Lancet Retracts Paper Linking Vaccine to Aut-
ism, WASH. PoST, Feb. 3, 2010, at A2.
240 See Sandra G. Boodman, Faith Lets Some Kids Skip Shots, WASH. POST,
June 10, 2008, at Fl; Neil Genzlinger, Vaccinations: A Hot Debate Still Burning,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, at C3 (noting "celebrity advocacy by Jenny McCarthy and
Jim Carrey," adding that the Internet "is the reason that vaccines will never be fully
exonerated, no matter how many studies clear them"); see also Daniela Caruso, Aut-
ism in the US: Social Movement and Legal Change, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 483, 501-05
(2010). Physicians also may become targets of advocacy group efforts to influence
their prescribing decisions. See Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval
Process?: Mifepristone Embroils the FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 571, 585-86 & nn.69-70 (2001).
241 See, e.g., Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d
242, 247 (3d Cir. 1998) (treating as noncommercial speech a pro-life group's adver-
tisement that linked abortion and breast cancer notwithstanding inclusion of contact
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plaintiffs' lawyers propagated the same message in client-seeking
advertisements, then commercial speech doctrine presumably would
allow the government somewhat greater leeway to restrict the disse-
242
mination of such (mis)information, putting to one side the difficult
question of what it means to say that medical or scientific information
is demonstrably "false." 243 In short, if private actors engage in com-
mercial speech that dampens demand in a manner that the government
regards as counterproductive to the public health, then perhaps it
could try to prohibit such speech altogether.244 In light of the Supreme
Court's latest commercial speech decisions, however, such an ap-
information for unaffiliated medical malpractice attorneys); see also Jess Alderman,
Words to Live By: Public Health, the First Amendment, and Government Speech, 57
BUFF. L. REV. 161, 168 & n.32, 213-14, 216 & n.308, 224 (2009); Gostin & Javitt,
supra note 1, at 550-5 1; cf Lars Noah, A Postmodernist Take on the Human Embryo
Research Debate, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1133, 1140 n.26 (2004) (noting that some anti-
abortion groups use billboards along major highways to communicate their messag-
es).
242 Unlike pharmacists who want to advertise compounded drugs, lawyers
who engage in drug-related advertising do not contemplate any sale of a product. This
explains why the FDA would have no jurisdiction over them, and it also means that
the professional speech case law would govern the analysis. (Alternatively, the ambi-
guous case law involving product disparagement claims might help to resolve the
First Amendment issues. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 513 (1984); Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union, 330 F.3d 1110 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en banc).) Imagine, however, a state disciplinary board issuing a rule to
guard against the adverse public health consequences of lawyers exaggerating the
risks associated with still-marketed prescription drugs. Cf Kids Against Pollution v.
Cal. Dental Ass'n, 143 P.3d 655 (Cal. 2006) (remanding question, raised in a case
related to the alleged dangers of mercury in dental amalgam, of whether a profession-
al association's ethical code and advisory opinions constituted fully protected
speech); Bailey v. Huggins Diagnostic & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 952 P.2d 768, 770-73
(Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting tort claims against the author of a book that had
exaggerated the risks associated with mercury in dental amalgam); Avi Salzman,
Dentist Wins a Round on Mercury Warnings, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, at CT4.
243 Cf Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)
("Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision."); Noah, supra note 179, at
378-82 (drawing parallels to "evidence-based medicine"); Noah, supra note 237, at
361-63 (discussing "knowability thresholds" in tort litigation); Martin H. Redish,
Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression and the Twi-
light Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1433, 1443 (1990) (emphasizing
the "principle of epistemological humility," and concluding that, "viewed from the
broad perspective of history, any attempt by the government to lock in a prevailing
scientific consensus is likely to be either futile or dangerous").
244 The FDA has done something along these lines when it prevents drug
manufacturers from including truthful but unduly alarming risk information in patient
labeling for therapeutically valuable products. See, e.g., Dowhal v. SmithKline Bee-
chain Consumer Healthcare, 88 P.3d 1, 4-5, 15 (Cal. 2004) (holding that the agency's
decision to exclude information about reproductive toxicity of nicotine in smoking
cessation products preempted a state warning requirement).
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proach would founder on the anti-paternalism principle, leaving the
government instead with the uphill battle of attempting to counter
such speech with its own message.245
Physicians and patients do not exhaust the range of audiences tar-
geted by drug industry promotional efforts. Companies also may try to
influence the broader public health community, whether through di-
rect lobbying or by using patient advocacy groups.24 6 For instance,
Merck aggressively lobbied states to require the use of its new vaccine
Gardasilo (designed to prevent a sexually transmitted disease, human
papillomavirus (HPV), that is linked to cervical cancer).2 47 Manufac-
245 The FDA has at times mandated the use of exaggerated warnings-for
instance, about the risks of products containing chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) propel-
lants-solely in the hope of influencing purchasing behavior (and, thereby, encourag-
ing reformulation) even though the products posed no direct risks to consumers. See
Noah, supra note 7, at 313-14; see also id. at 342-43 (describing California's carci-
nogen warning law); Rick Weiss, Results Retracted on Ecstasy Study, WASH. POST,
Sept. 6, 2003, at A3 ("The error has renewed charges that government-funded scien-
tists . . . have been biased in their assessment of ecstasy's risks and potential bene-
fits."); Steven Woloshin et al., A Shot of Fear, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2005, at FI ("To
promote vaccine use, many in the public health community have overstated the risk of
flu-related death and the effectiveness of the vaccine in preventing it.").
246 See Elizabeth Agnvall, Making Us (Nearly) Sick: A Majority ofAmericans
Are Now Considered to Have at Least One "Pre-Disease" or "Borderline" Condi-
tion, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2004, at FI (reporting that disease-specific associations,
"nearly all" of which receive funding from the pharmaceutical industry, frequently
offer more aggressive treatment recommendations than panels of independent ex-
perts); Thomas Ginsberg, Donations Tie Drug Firms and Nonprofits, PHILA.
INQUIRER, May 28, 2006, at Al ("[M]any patient groups and drug companies main-
tain close, multimillion-dollar relationships while disclosing limited or no details
about the ties."); id. ("For drug companies, patient groups carry credibility that the
industry sometimes lacks to target patients and 'opinion leaders' who drive prescrip-
tions, and hence, sales. Nonprofits also help patients stay on the medicine and push
insurers to pay for it."); see also In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods.
Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d 837 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (rejecting First Amendment defense raised
by the National Hemophilia Foundation); Thomas B. Edsall, Drug Industry Financing
Fuels Pro-GOP TV Spots, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2002, at Al I (reporting that a trade
association underwrote the United Seniors Association).
247 See Rob Stein, A Vaccine Debate Once Focused on Sex Shifts as Boys
Join the Target Market, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2009, at Al ("Merck also began an
ambitious marketing campaign and lobbying push to persuade states to add the vac-
cine to the list of those required for children to attend school. But the company even-
tually abandoned the strategy in the face of an intense backlash from critics . . . .");
see also Sheila M. Rothman & David J. Rothman, Marketing HPV Vaccine: Implica-
tions for Adolescent Health and Medical Professionalism, 302 JAMA 781, 785
(2009) (criticizing the manufacturer's grants to professional medical associations,
which were designed to spread the word); cf Sylvia Law, Human Papillomavirus
Vaccination, Private Choice, and Public Health, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1731, 1758
(2008) ("[TJhe Merck campaign can be seen as [a] public education program to in-
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turers of anticonvulsant (and other) drugs have undertaken various
efforts to discourage switching patients to generic substitutes. 248 Eli
Lilly, in response to disappointing sales of its sepsis drug XigrisO
(drotrecogin), launched an unusual multi-pronged campaign designed
to spur demand: funding and then publicizing a survey about rationing
in ICUs, securing a new diagnostic code for severe sepsis, urging
states to require tracking of sepsis cases, and lobbying for special
Medicare reimbursement. 249 Manufacturers of antidepressants and
atypical antipsychotic drugs have involved themselves in revisions of
the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), an influential reference guide for
mental health care professionals. 250 Lastly, of course, companies have
little choice but to respond in the press and elsewhere when the safety
and effectiveness of their products come under fire.25 1
form people of a problem of which they were not aware."); id. at 1758-60 (respond-
ing to criticisms of Merck's lobbying efforts).
248 See Jonathan D. Rockoff, Cost of Medicine Could Increase: Brand-Name
Drugmakers Target Generic Prescriptions, BALT. SUN, June 17, 2008, at 1 A; Sarah
Rubenstein, Pill Push: Industry Fights Switch to Generics for Epilepsy-Big Drug
Makers Help Patient Groups Lobby, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2007, at Al. Note, howev-
er, that a brand-name drug manufacturer could not suggest in advertising that its
product differed from a generic drug that the FDA rated as therapeutically equivalent.
See Kessler & Pines, supra note 209, at 2412.
249 See Antonio Regalado, Who Gets Health Care? Rationing in an Age of
Rising Costs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2003, at Al; see also Thomas M. Burton, Can
Hospitals Afford Not to Prescribe Xigris, Eli Lilly's New Drug?, WALL ST. J., Sept.
11, 2001, at B 1 (reporting that the company initially had launched a marketing cam-
paign that warned hospitals of potential tort liability if they failed to stock the drug).
250 See Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Con-
struct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 293-94 (1999); Shankar Vedantam, Experts Defining
Mental Disorders Are Linked to Drug Firms, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2006, at A7
("Every psychiatric expert involved in writing the standard diagnostic criteria for
disorders such as depression and schizophrenia has had financial ties to drug compa-
nies that sell medications for those illnesses, a new analysis has found."); see also
Thomas R. Insel, Psychiatrists' Relationships with Pharmaceutical Companies: Part
of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 303 JAMA 1192, 1192-93 & n.8 (2010);
Benedict Carey & Gardiner Harris, Psychiatric Association Faces Senate Scrutiny
over Drug Industry Ties, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2008, at A13; Rob Stein, The Next
Generation of Mental Disorders?, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2010, at Al; Shankar Ve-
dantam, Criteria for Depression Are Too Broad, Researchers Say: Guidelines May
Encompass Many Who Are Just Sad, WASH. POsT, Apr. 3, 2007, at A2. See generally
Lars Noah, Comfortably Numb: Medicalizing (and Mitigating) Pain-and-Suffering
Damages, 42 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 431 (2009).
251 See, e.g., Melody Petersen, Wyeth Criticizes Media Coverage of Hormone
Replacement Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2002, at C8; see also Alex Berenson, In the
Money and in Court; Drug Industry Braces for New Suits over Even More of Its
Products, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2006, at Cl; Anna W. Mathews & Thomas M. Bur-
ton, After Medtronic Lobbying Push, the FDA Had a Change of Heart: Agency
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Commentators have criticized the drug industry for promoting the
medicalization of normal or relatively minor conditions.2 52 Although
increased sales are the ultimate goal of such efforts, the commercial
speech doctrine does not appear to define the government's power to
intrude when industry messages avoid referencing a particular prod-
uct. 253 Instead, the greater constitutional protections afforded to pure
speech-and the affiliated right to petition,2 54 which critics of the
commercial speech doctrine never seem to confront-seemingly
would come into play.2 5 5 In any case, whether evaluated using strict
Squelches an Article Raising Doubts on Safety of Device to Repair Artery, WALL ST.
J., July 9, 2004, at Al (describing stent graft manufacturer's success in blocking a
paper written by agency scientists that had recommended surgery for most aortic
aneurysm patients).
252 See Ray Moynihan et al., Selling Sickness: The Pharmaceutical Industry
and Disease Mongering, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 886 (2002); Rob Stein, Marketing the
Illness and the Cure? Drug Ads May Sell People on the Idea That They Are Sick,
WASH. POST, May 30, 2006, at A3; Fiona Walsh, Glaxo Denies Pushing "Lifestyle"
Treatments, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Apr. 28, 2006, at 28 (GSK "defended itself against
accusations that it is turning healthy people into patients by 'disease mongering' and
pushing 'lifestyle' treatments for little-known ailments [e.g., restless leg syndrome].
Studies published in a respected medical journal ... accused the big pharmaceutical
companies of 'medicalising' problems such as high cholesterol and sexual dysfunc-
tion."); see also Marc Kaufman, Hormone Replacement Gets New Scrutiny, WASH.
POST, Aug. 14, 2002, at Al (reporting that "federal officials want to explore whether
hormone therapies and their producers have encouraged women to believe menopause
is a condition to be treated, rather than an inevitable and natural set of changes to be
managed," noting "the FDA's discomfort with the way that hormone treatments have
been widely presented as an antidote to menopause").
253 See Gostin & Javitt, supra note 1, at 554-55 (discussing newspaper "ad-
vertorials" published by tobacco firms); see also Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654,
680-81 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of petition for certiorari as im-
providently granted); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001)
(characterizing commercial speech as speech "that does no more than propose a
commercial transaction"); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67
(1983) (defining as commercial speech paid advertisements that reference a specific
product and serve the speaker's commercial motivation); Nat Stern, In Defense of the
Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55 (1999).
254 See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Signi-
ficance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2153 (1998); Lars Noah, Sham
Petitioning as a Threat to the Integrity of the Regulatory Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1,
59-60 & n.239 (1995); James E. Pfander, Restoring the Right to Petition, 94 Nw. U.
L. REV. 219 (1999).
255 See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1034-36 (1991); Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533-44 (1980); Robert
M. O'Neil, Nike v. Kasky-What Might Have Been ... ,54 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1259 (2004); Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General
Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 235, 237 (1998). But see Nat'l Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157
(7th Cir. 1977) (treating claims by a trade association on a matter of public health
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scrutiny or the stringent form of intermediate scrutiny applied in
Western States, the government would find it difficult to defend ef-
forts at banning corporate communications about matters of public
health (not explicitly presented as efforts to sell particular products)
simply because these messages might conflict with the official line.2 56
CONCLUSION
The fundamental tension between the First Amendment and pub-
lic health, already evident in other domains, seems to be even more
pronounced in connection with the marketing of medical technologies.
Perhaps this illuminates a central flaw in the Supreme Court's current
approach to commercial speech cases insofar as its increasingly strin-
gent application of Central Hudson's nexus prongs has effectively
narrowed the range of substantial government interests that can pass
muster. Conversely, it might suggest that public health regulatory
agencies have gone about their business in entirely the wrong way
insofar as they prefer to manipulate the flow of information instead of
directly tackling hazardous behaviors. Whatever the case, the tension
between the First Amendment and efforts at public health promotion
highlights the mistakes that might arise from importing either consti-
tutional doctrine or regulatory policy designed for vice products when
examining issues related to prescription pharmaceuticals and devices.
Otherwise, we stand little chance of sensibly balancing public health
promotion with the guarantees of free speech.
dispute as commercial speech subject to regulation); Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited:
Can Commercial Corporations Engage in Non-Commercial Speech?, 39 CoNN. L.
REV. 379, 426, 447-48 (2006) (arguing that all speech by publicly traded for-profit
corporations qualifies as commercial speech entitled to reduced constitutional protec-
tions).
256 See Berman, supra note 119, at 790-93.

